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SUR91ARY
The paper presents a carefully defined model of the process of social
change leading to continuing technological progress, with explicit state-
ment of assumiptions and steps in the argument, i.e. of parameters, variables,
functional relationships, and the path of movement of the model. It is
hoped that the statement of the model may itself be a contribution to the
analysis of the process, and that in addition the frmework provided may
cast light on the assumptions which are implicit in other special hypo-
theses ouch as the theory of the "Protestant ethic," the doctrine of
cumulative scientific advance, end the economic hypotheses of Nurkse and
Rosenstein-Rodan.
Section I states the problem and surveys the literature briefly (1).
Section II states in elerentary f'-m the concept of an analytical model,
and indicates the nature of the analysis to be used, that of "comparative
positions analysis3 and dynamics (7). Section III presents the parameters
and variables of the model, indicates the value of each variable in
peasant society and technologically progressive society respectively (13).
Section IV states the functional relationships among the variables (38).
Section V sketches the dynamics of the change from peasant society to
technologically progressive society (51). Section VI applies the model
to the courae of social change in Japan from 1600 on which led with his-
toric irvitab.ity to the Meiji Restoration and "modernization" (73),
An apendix discuss-e- popuation theory briefly.
The parameters of the model are the natural resources of a society
and the characteristics of its people. The variables are eighteen in
number. They are grouped under five heads. The full meaning of each
term used is not necessarily evident from the summary below, since some
terms are used in senses specifically defined in the text.
1. Structure of production.
1.1 Techniques.
1,2 Rate of technological progress.
13 Composition of output,
1.4 Rate of saving and investment.
15 Composition of investment.
l6 Geographic scope of economic community.
2. Structure of class relationships.
20l Social separation of classes.
2.2 Concentration-dispersion of control of production.
2.3 Breadth of participation in national political processes.
3. Scope of individual experience.
3.1 Knowledge of science and technology.
3.2 Scope of 1xternal experience.
4. Personality structure.
4.1 Torld view.
4.1.1 Physical world view.
4.1.2 Social world view.
4.,2 Lotivations.
4.2.1 Need dependency--need achie.ament.
4.2,,2 Need affiliation--need autonoiry.
.2.3 Neesd dominance.
L1
4.3 Uccupational values.
5. Pattern variables of interpersonal relationships.
5.1 Quality performance.
5.2 Diffuseness--specificity.
iii
I. The Problem: The Transition to Continuing Technological Progress
Capital formation is frequently regarded as the process immediately
responsible for continuing economic growth--growth in per capita output
and inco.e in a society. But it is clear that capital formation is important
only as it is the carrier or agent of technological progress.
Moses Abramovitz has -hown that less than one-fifth of t he growth
in productivity (per man-hour) in the United States from the decade
1669-7t to the decade 1944-53 is associated statistically with increase
in capital per worker; between eighty and ninety-five percent is
associated with im rovements in methods.* In a simpler and looser
M4oses Abraiovitz, Resource and Output ?:ends in the United States
Since 1670 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 52,l96),
pp. 10-11. The calculation, with alternative weights, yields alternative
estimates that increase in capital per worker accounted for 5.3% and 20.1%
of the increase in output per capita. Abramovitz notes that the higher
percentage in all likelihood is an overstatement of the maximum reasonable
estimate.
*
calculation, Cairneress has shown the same thing for Western Europe.
*
A6 K. Cairncross, "The Place of Capital in Economic Progress",
Economic Progress, Leon Dupriez, ed. (Louvain, 1955), pp. 235-248.
And these two cases are examples of a general principle: without con-
tinuing technological progress, growth in ge. cacita income would come
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gradually to a complete stop even with a high continuing' rate of capital
formation. If this is not intuitively obvious, an elegant rigorous proof
is provided in an article by R. M. Solow.
Robert M. Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,"Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1956.
Technological progress is not a "natural" event. It cries out for
explanation. Continuing technological progress has appeared in the world
within the last two centuries, and even within that period only in a snall
fraction of the world's societies, even though elite in virtually all
societies are seeking it. What forces bring about the transition from
virtually stationary technology to continuing progress? There is reasonably
good evidence that availability of scientific knowledge is not sufficient,
and that presmnce of economic opportunity and availability of economic
resources are not sufficient. A central problem in the theory of economic
growth therefore is, How does the trannition core about?
Classical economic theory, as at progressed toward formal analytical
models, progressively concentrated on capital formation a6 the basis of
economic growth, and ignored technological change--perhaps because tech-
nological change cannot be dealt with well within an economic ztodel.
Adam Smith made some wise observations about the institutions conducive
to it, but he regarded the institutions as subject to deliberate initiation
by judicious men, and not as resultants of a social process. In his
population theory, kialthus considered technological progress, not as a
process resulting from the nature of the social forces which must there-
fore enter integrally irto his analysis, but as an external factor, related
a.3a
only accidentally to other sacial development, which might offset population
growth for a time but obviously could not do so in the long run. And
*T. S. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, 8th ed.
(London, 1878). -resent-day population theorists have not advanced beyond
Malthus in this respect.
by the time of J. S. Mill's theory of the stationary state, technologicdl
progress had vanished from the analysis. Mill's analysis of the gradual
tapering to zero of capital form-aation and the rise of ger cIaA real
income is internally consistent only because of the complete absence of
technological progress in the model.
*J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economr (London, 1891), ook IV.
Nor did he or other classical economists give it more than cursory
mentiun, if arg, anywhere else. The classical economists, to generalize,
had no theory of innovation. They either disregarded innovation, or naively
regarded men as having a "natural" propensity to innovate, if external
barriers were removed. And modern economists who have turned their
attenticra to the problem of economic development have unfortunately in
general followed the classical writers. N-urkse still regardd thie problem
as essentially merely one of capital fonation, and the daterminants of
whether economic development occurs as purely economic. Colin Glark,
Ragnar Nkrkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdevloped
Countries (New York, 19 53.
wr iting on the Conditions of Economic Progress, apparently reards tech-
nological progress as automatic, given the economic conditions.*
*Colin Cla rk, Conditions of Economicfrogress, rev, ed., (a ork,
1957).
W.Arthur Lewis is aware of the problem. In his volume on The Theory cf
*
1Rconomic Growth he sets out to survey all relevant factors. However,
W.A. Lewis, The lheory of TMconomic Growth (London, 1955).
his comments about the roots of innovation are at best wise observations
and at worst laymen's prejudices, and do not, it seems to me, approach
systematically the problem of what the social process of change is that
is involved. Professor B.S. Keiratead, in his Theory of Economic Change,
*B.S. Keirstead, The Theory of Economic Change (Toronto, 1948).
recognizes the differing effects of differing "institutional frameworks."
W. W, Rostow sets forth a general schema of "propensities"and "yields"
leading to economic development, but without analyzing how the propensities
may come to exist. Professor J. A. Schumpeter has discussed entrepre-s
In The Proess of Economic Developnt (New Yor, 1954). See also
his "The Take-Off Into Self-Sustained Growth," Economic Journal, March 1956
in which without discussing them he lists the "preconditions" for a "take-
off" into continuing economic growth. In several other manuscripts as
yet unpublished Rostow contributes brilliant insights into various aspects
of the problem.
neurship as a key factor in development, in his Theory of Rconomic Develop-
*
megt and elsewhere. But though his insights are brilliant, as always,
*
. A, Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (Cambridge,
ass., 1949).
the range of his interest is in this case too limited, Usher has attacked
the problem in the revised edition of his History of Mechanical Inventions,
A, P. Usher, A Hiatory of Mechanical Inventions, rev. ed, (Cambridge,
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Mass., 1954).
but he treats it as a problem in purely individual psychology, rather
than in social change.
Jor did the most influential theorist of economic change, Karl Marx$
approach the problem. Rather, he asserts that there is no problem.
Given a just division of the fruits of economic progress the progress
will automatically occur. . His most recent follower. to write on the
**
general subject, Paul A. Baran, takes a similar viewpoint.
Paul A. Baran, The Political Econa of -Growth (New York, 1957)
Taw non-economists since Weber and Tawney have displayed interest
in the question. Most sociologists and anthropologists have so far
interested themselves in analysis of the structure of given societies
and part-societies, rather than in the problem of social change, or
have analysed small sectors of social charge without attempting to generalize.
These studies are of course the necessary !orerunnere of theories of
change. Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser in their recent book
and Society have attempted an integration 2 economic and general social
Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Ecorpa and Society (London, 19,6),
process theory, but their theory is dynmic jn a way which is trivial
with reference to the problem being discussed naere (though certainly not
trivial in any general sense). Oghurn has written in general of social
change; G. and M. Wilson have contributed inval,'.able suggestions in their
W. F. Ogburn, Social Change with iRespect tc Culture and Orijna
mature (New York, 1927).
- - - - I M" 
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little book on The Analyis of Social Change;*and such writers as Weber
*. & M. Wilson, The Analysis of Social 4hange(Cambridge, England,
1954).
ard Durkheim have of cou:ke presented brilliant suggestions and pieces
of formal theory which any later writer must take into account. But
none of these writers has evolved a system of theory which modern social
scientists would regard as an acceptable basis of either a genecal theory
of total social change ~or, specifically, a thory of the appearance in
a society of continuing technological progress.
Homer Barnett, in Innovation: The Basis of Cultural Chmgne (New York,
1953), has tackled the probler of the individ.l innovation head-on, but,
as he himself says in his-Introduction, he does not treat innovations "as
components in patterns of .. nge." his is micro-, rather than macro-analysis.
My definition of "continuing technological progress" is purely empirical.
It is simply technological advances sufficiently frequent and of sufficient
effect on production so that output per worker in the society as whole i.-
creases considerably each decnde for as many as three successive decades.
By this imprecise but sufPicient definition, such instances of acce-
lerated innovation as t hat in ancient ione and that in Florence and Venice
during the Italian Renaissance were not "continuous technological progress."
The line drawn is not rmerely one of convenience. Where technological progress
has become sufficiently rapid and sufficiently widespread to increase pro-
ductivity markedly per decade for as much as three decades, the advance haa
continued subsequently, whereas a number of spurts too btief or insufficiently
*In every case where the record is clear. ihere are one or two un-
certain cases.
pervasive in the economy to ieet this test haive proved to be temporry 9
The rate and breadth of advance
-*7.'
is presumably not itself the cause of continuing progress, but it is
evidence that the causal factors underlying it have taken hold so deeply
that they hgve changed the nature of socio-econoilic processes.
In my judgment, the various social sciences have now progressed to
a point at which a first hal$tng general statement of a theory of t4e
transition of a soctety frm virtually stationary technoLogy to con-
tinuing technological progreps is possible. It is attempted in this paper.*
4hch is the successor to a previoQus paper, "The Theory of Economic
Development, 11 which apneared in Economic Development and Cultural Change,
Vol. V, No. 3 (April l.57), pp. 19-2l5
In spIte of the referepce to a first attempt, no claim is made to the
presentation of new social or psychological theories. It is hoped at
best that the attempt to present a ger:l dynaric analytical model may
contr~ibute somte worthwhile ideas to the analysis of one specific typo
of social change.
II. Th@ Pt4re q t,#e Analy sc4 Process.
pecttpor III cqntras~s a peasant society with virtually stationary
teghrpj.,ogr an a .ggiety c4 p optinuing technological progress. Section IV
discypses "funcign4 reljtAonships" among variabls in a peasant society.
ptqp V, sggestq aq hypoteis about the forOes bringng amatti n
fromI the og to ti pthef fad the path of the transition, Section VI
pppleg $4 hypothess t9 tpe Oevlopment of Japan. The discussion in
peg$.Pns V and I (s qouched ebsentially in terns pf analytical podel,
PIough tie rigor gf exprgesi n invo;Lved in the analysis of a model is
4iluted scmewhat by discussion of $he complexities of reality. , suggest
that in studying the problem of the transition of a society
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from static technology to continuing technological cnange, it
fruitful to construct a model embodying social psycholJogical,
economic variables thought to reflect all of the relev ant ess.
characteristics of human society, and to trace interr-lation
them- and their effects over time, instead of conceiviig of or
(Weber's"Protestant ethic", Schumpeter's spirit of en reprene
or the economic opportunity sometimes assumed to be th'e movir
by economists) as a first cause and tracing out unly -ts effr
An analytical mtdel consists, of course, of a nu-iber of
factors, specified "functical" relationships ar.ong tIem, an,-
also certain parameters or constants. In a simple economic i
market, the pararraters may be the number of persons i i the m:
and their incomes; the variables, the quantities of v irious t
and services offered for sale in the market, the quaniities i
wish to buy, and the price at which the sale of each cakes p'
the functional relationships, the amount of each corr.dity o,
that each seller w ould offer at each of various price and t:
that each buyer would buy at each of various possible pricos
In a to.e complex model, the quantity of one cc amodity
wishes to sell might depend not only on the price of that co
also on the prices of other commodities and services, and th
each buyer wishes to buy riight similarly be affected by the
other commodities and services.
y ihah-ips na be thought of as causal relationsI ps thou
mathemiatical concept of function avoids the implicato )n of c
*See page 11, below.
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In the model presented below for the study of technological progress,
the parameters are the natural resources and population of a society
(including the biogenic characteristics of the population); the variables
are certain economic aspects of the society, certain facts about class
structure in the society, certain personality characte.ristics of the
member#, certain "pattern variables" of interpersonal relationships,
and the state of scientific knowledge. The functional relationships are
the wans in which each of these variables is influenced by, or depends
upon, others of them (including dependence oh the state of affairs in
past time ptyriods as well as in the present),
Explicitly or implicitly, in a sociol&gical model of tAis sort as
well as in a model in economics or the physical sciences, each variable
must be homogeneous, so that its magnitude or "value" is simply a matter
of more or less. For example, in the simple economic model, the variations
will be a smaller or la rger quqntity of each commodity or service offered
for sale, a smaller or larger quantity demanded by buyers, a higher or
lower price of each. This need for homogeneous quantitativeness creates
some difficulties in the sociological model presented here, because of the
complexity of some of the variables, They vary in several dimensions,
not merely in two. These difficulties are met by the simplifications
indicated in Section III.
The value of each variable at any time may depend only on the value
of one or more other variables at the time, or it may also depend on
values of itself or other variables in past periods. The mutual inter-
acti ,mong all of the variables determines both the value of all, and
in the latter case also determines their cou-?e over time, Since each
variable is quantitative and homogeneous, each may be expressed as a
mathematical symbol, the functional relationship of each to others or
to past values Of itself may be expressed in an equation, and the values
of all of the variables at any given time may be determined by solving
the system of equatio&s, At least this is true conceptually; it may
not be possible to i. dicate the precise relationships,* do the calculations,
* In mathematical jargon, te shape of some of the functions may not
be defined.
and arrive at quant.tative solutions. Evtn if this is not possible,
a set of equati.ns (verbal or algebraic) presenting a clear statement
of the nature of tie relationship of each vzriable to each other may
contribute much ti an understanding of the oplration of the system,
This more limitec goal is the objective of thie paper.
The analysi: of a model may be "static" oi "dynamic". If the value
of each variable depends only on the values of cther variables at the
same time, the et of equations indicate$only the values of the several
variables that ire consistent with each other, and thus indicateS the value
of each variablJ in equilibrium, without indicating -he path of change
of the value o1 each variable over time. In this case the analysis is
said to be stal Lc. If however the set of equations ind. cates that the
value of some iriables depends also on values of variab'.es in previous
time periods, a d permits analysis of the changes in the values of the
several variabl3 over time, such analysis is said to be danamic. Some
dykamic systems aay approach an equilibrium, after which the values of the
variable will n t 'hange, but tile sociological system being aialyzed here
must be considere' as forever changing.
-10-
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..n a static system, the value of one of the variables, and perhaps
also .ts functimxial relati.nship to other' variables, or the value of
one of the paramet-ers, may arbitrarily to assumed to be changed by some
force .vrom outside the system, in order to calculate what changes in the
other viriables and thus in the systry as a whole will follow. If this
is done, it is permissible to refer to this "exogenous" change as being
the caust of a sequence of other changes in the system, given the other
characteiLsfics of th3 system, If iuch an exogenous change is introduced
into a dytiamic system, the subseque'it path of the system over time will
be diffenl rnt from what it would othe.rwise have ben. This exogenous
change mar then be said to be th- catse of this differe.ce in path.
To speak >f one variable alone as the '.nuse of other variables in any
other serse is meaningless, All mutually determine all.*
* "ice the avoidance of the concept of causation in the concept
of functhrn.
A static systeii may arrive at a new 'quilibrium if one or more
functioni l relationships among the variablv is changed permanently,
i.@. if i exogenou; change such as mentioL d above is made permanent.
It is the i possible to determine the value (, each variable in each of
the two iquilibuiums and t o compare the twc equilibrium conditions
without ietermining the path of movement bet% en them, Such analysis
It does not seem necessary to introduce here the concepts of stable
sad nst ble equilibria,
is ':novi as "comparative statics." Analyzing t. course of change is
tei ned dynamics."
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Because Section III compares a peasant society and a society with
continuing technological change, it is tempting to regard the discussion
of Section I as cumparative statics. Actually, however, not even a
peqsant society is quite in equilibrium, Infrequent technological change
is occurring, and this technological change will slowly cause other
changes. Hence the society is dynamic, even though the change is extremely
slow. And of course, later in time, when continuing technological change
ivs entered the system, it is even more dynamic.
What Section III does i,. to "freeze" the system at each of two points
in time, and to compare the value of each variable at the two times.
I*
There is no term in the literature for such a comparison. For convenience,
*
The term "comparative dynamics" has been appropriated for another
use. See Paul A. Samuelson, Foundatius of Economic Anai (Cambridge, Mass.,,
,19-3), Cho I.
*
it may be referred to s "comparative positions analysis".
Underlying the use of this term is the assumption that two positions
of the same dynamic system are being compare. Some of the discussion
below assumes, howevezrr not only that the internal dynamics of the system
have beeh operating over time, but also that an exogenous force has inter-
vened between the two points in time being compared. Since there is no
tay of defining the nature of such a comparison except to specify the
nature of the exogenous force, the comparison can hardly be given a general
designation.
The comparison will be limited to variables regarded as necessarily
differing in the two situations if there is very slow technological progress
in the one and continuing technological progress in the other. The des-
cription will be purely verbal, not mathematical, While attention will
be focussed on the values of each variable discussed in an "ideal" peasant
and technologically progressive society respectively,comment will be
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made concerning apparent differences among various "real life" societies
of each type with regard to each variable. ihe discussion will there-
fore not present the a ppearance of an analytical model, even though in
essence one will be presented.
III. Societies Without and With Continuing Technological Change.
Betxe of the "underdeveloped" economies of "real life" are not yet
entirely peasant societies, but partly nomadic or pastoral. In this essay,
however, no attempt will be made to sketch the societal dyhanics leading
up to peasantry. The starting point for discussion will be a peasmat
society.
Many societies of today in which peasantry is prominent are not
pure peasant societies, Contacts with the West, by means of colonial
rule or otherwise, has somewhat altered the peAsant society structure.
But the relationships sketched here are still important elements in these
societies, Consider in simple outline various crispiciuous overt charge-
teristics of a peasant society.
*A peasant society is a dual society, consisting of a number of
*See Robert idfield, Peasant Saciety and Culture (Chicago, 1956).
agricultural villages plus a center which is a tradin city or the king's
court, or perhaps of several centers, each of which is the castle city
of a noble ev a regional chieftain. There is little migration into or
out of each village; the village consists of a virtually unchanging
group of families. Peasant agriculture is the basic occupation of all
or almost all of the families. Some individuals are craftsmen and a few
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are traders. All three functions may be cumbined in the same person or
family. Methods of production are primitive, and productivity is low,
Change in methods is so infrequent that without serious distortion
methods may be described as unchanging.
The family may be the nuclear family of the West, consisting of
husband, wife, and children, but it is more apt to be the extended fanily,
consisting of s-iverql generations, and to be patriarchal, the oldest mle
making decisions for the group. For as family members marry, they con-
tinue to live close to eqch other, and relations must angulated. Further,
to cope with the mysterious forces in the midst of which life is.carried
or the longest experience is the wisest guide.
Relationships with other villages may be limited to a trickle of
trade. If so, it may be thqt no code of national interpersonal ethics
*
has developed parallel to that which binds members of the village together.
*For a summary discussion of this code, see pages 33-36 below.
To residents of the village outsiders not guests of the village may be
as fair game for banditry or personal violene as were all the members
of such societies to the European traders of the sixteenth to eighteenth
centuries. Even where national authority has developed and social standards
forbid violence, the code of honesty and mutual responsibility of village
life may not apply to strangers, who may be objects of craft, guile, and
deception.
The elite of the society live in the main in the center, though
members of the elite group (officials, teachers, rent-collectors) may
represent it in the villages. Whetier or not the organization of the
-15-
society ia precisely feudal, the elite receive a considerable fraction
of the produce of the peasant in the fi-m of feudal dues, rent, or tax
*
levies* The gap between villagers and elite is great. The only social
*
I shall generally use the term villagers rather than peasant to
refer i:to the non-elite in a peasant society, since in some such societles
divisLn of labor has progressed to a point at which some villagers are
full--tme artisans or traders, rather than peasants.
group -n which the villager participates and feels any sense of control
is that of his village, and in ,i tional affairs the control of the elite
is virtially absolute, though even here it is limited by customary rules
governirg relationships between elite and villagers, and especially bet-
ween eli e and peasantry.
Theian is little contact with any foreign country, though a small
trickle o.' trade, and with it a small trickle of ideas across :sational
borders, otcur. The incoming ideas penetrate little beyond the center,
Various cultural inheritances from earlier periods, fully explicable
only in terms of the history of each society, tny govern many aspects
of life.
Such a sosiety contrasts in a variety of obvious ways with any of
the technologicilly progressive societies of today. By definition, in
a technological. v progressive society technical innovations are occurring
in a greatly inc eased flow. They are occurring, not only in "industry",
i.e. in fabricatl.ig and processing, but in all sectors of economic activity,
not merely by a , lected group of persons termed entrepreneurs, but by
persons or cluste:s. of persons scattered through all reaks of the gain-
fully employ, d. as a result of past advances in productivity, level is
higlher ten in peasant society.
A larger percentage of the persons devotin, their energies to eco-
nomically productive activities is engaed in 'business"- term which
may be used to include 1ll econmic activities other thrn ngriculture.
Usually, though not necessarily, the percentage engaged in each major
sector of business taken separete4y--eeg, in commerce--is also larger.
Maniufacturing in the modern sensa has emerkgedo Cities exist. Communi-
cation and travel throughout the society and to foreign countries, is
,reater than in peasant societies, as is foreign trade.
The percentage of' the national income saved and devoted to the
formation of new productive plant and equipment is greater. A capital
muarket has been developed. Capital formati.-n in every major sactor of
a
ecouomic activity is probably greater (as/percentage of the value of
output in the sector) than in peasant society, but the increase is not
uniform. If the econc.ay is in the earlr 'stage of technological progress,
tnere is a coricentratia n of iivestient in transportation, power, -nd
perhaps urban f'acilities. In other respects, the -pattern of investment
varies among dev/loping societies, depending on the natural r-sources
and national goals oi the society, the economic opportunities facing it,
and perhaps also on historical accidento The nation rather than the village
is the ecor.omic community.
With respect to tha control of production and of govevnment, two
contrasting situations have emerged, In all technologically progressive
societies, a social group wnich was not previously the dominant group
has gained increased economic power. In some countries, of which the
arahetype is the Soviet Union, the socially rebellious group has gained
control of the atiparatus of governmnt, and a centralized and dictatorial
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government controls not only production but a much wider variety of
other human affairs than was true in peasant society. Where, on the
other hand, the rising group did not gain (and may hot have sought)
such control, the disperdion of economic power is far greator than in
peasant society. So also is participation by the mass of the people
in the national society and in thl- control of government. Even in the
dictatorships, tho sense of participatio1 n of the mass of the people in
the national society is much greater Vaiu in peasant society, and the
dictators are necessarily responsive to a considerable degree to the.
popular will, except for limited periods, with respect to a wider range
of affairs than was true in peasant society. In the discussion in the
remainder of this paper, I take the democratic case as the central case,
but with comments where necessary concerning the totalitarian case.
Out of the overt differences between peasant and technologically
progressiv, society, and by extending the analysis to 3ess obvious
aspects of the societies, we may deduce a set of varia'les which seem
to embpdy the essential differences between the two types of society.
For simplicity, I discuss the differences as though a given situation
characterized every sector and every individual of a society or a social
class within it. Obviously, no society or social class is homogeneous;
the assumption of homogeneity involves considerable oversimplificationo
But with respect to the variables discussed here, the deviations from
homogeneAy are sufficiently small so that thf- simplified model is ana&
lytically useful.
I group the variables under fi, heads, Concerning the first granp,
no further discussion f the differences between peasant and technologie'ally
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progressive society is necessary,
1. The structure of production.
1.1 The level of techniques (measured by output per manhour).
1.2 The rate of technological progress.
1.3 1he composition of output (i.e., the relative amount of various
types of commodities and services produced).
1.4 The rate of saving and] investment.
1.5 The composition (i.e., industrial distribution) of investment.
1o6 Geographic scope of the economic community,
2. The structure of class relationships.
2.1 Social separation of classes.
2.2 Concentration-dispersion of control of production.
2.3 Sreadth of participation in national political processes.
In a psychological sense, the elite and the villagers of a peasant
society live literally in different worlds, and have extremely few interests
in common. Nor is the gap between them bridged by a large middle class.
In some societies, it is true, the peasantry shade into the landed gentry,
and there are various grades or classes of nobles or warriors, so that
the steps from class to class may not seem to an outsider to be great.
Vertical mobility between certain classei in some such societies is con-
siderable--as in Burma or China. It ranges from this through th- very
limited mobility of pre-Meiji Japan to the caste system of India or
the feudalism of medieval Europe. Even where some mobility is possible,
however, the psychological distinction between villager and elite is
sharp, and extremely few persons actually ascend from the one class to
the other. Thus the common obs-rvation that in peasant societies there
is a great gap between the masses and the elite, and almost no middle
class, is in general correct.
Social gradations exist within the elite ind within the masses.
For example in pro-Meiji Japan there were six grades of samurai (elite),
and among the non-lite, before the peasant society began to disintegrate,
may pave
peasants, artisans, and merchants ormed a descending scale. In Burma,
the king's court and his officials formed higher and lower elite. Among
the villagers there was no class differentiation. Such distinctions
within the two major classes will not concern us. In most societies,
the clergy stands at one side in a special position, and cannot be fitted
into the secular hiararchy of classes.
In a technologically progressive society, in contrast with peasant
society, the development of a variety of new economic functions offering
varying degrees of economic reward causes the creation of a large middle
class. lhe degree of social mobility via economic success which exists
in the United States is an extreme case, but in all technologically piogressive
societies social mobility and the sixe of the middle class are considerable.
Even in totalitarian society with government ownersiip and operation of
all major non-agicultural activity, the necessity for considerable numbers
of technicians and managers creates a class comparable in social status
to the independent enterprisers and professional men who pe rform the same
functions in a private enterprise society.
The term class structure is sometimes used to refer only to these
social distinctions between classes. However, the delineation of class
relationships is not complete without description of their economic
aspects and their political manifestations. As is argued below in dis--
cussing the functional relationships among the variables, the social
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economic, and political aspects of class structure are common results
of one set of causes.
The contrasts between peasant and technologically progressive societies
with respect to the economic and political aspects of class relationships
need little discussion beyond that above. To lump all aspects of the
direction of production under the heading "concentration of control",
is admittedly a rather heroic simplification, but it will servo as an
index of a more complex phenomena. The term "control of z)duction" is
intended to refer both to its structure and to the. distribution of its
fruits. With respect to the f.tvamer, there is in a sense very little
human control in a peasant society; the composition of production is
determined largely by natural resources, human needs, and custom. Control
of the distribution of the fruits of production is concentrated. With
respect to control over production in both senses, totalitarian socieai
has moved away from peasant society in an opposite direction from demo-
cratic society. This is not true of any other characteristic relevant
here. (The degree of overt control of individual action in non-economic
spheres is not relevant. The degree of individual initiative, which is
relevant, is discussed below.)
3. The scope of individual experience.
3.1 The le-vel of scientific knowledge.
Crude concepts of the physical world, a rudimentary state
of all of the physical sciences, are associated with primitive methods
of production in peasant society. They characterize villager and elite
alike. Literacy is low. In some societies the religious duty of being
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able to read sacred passages in a rote sort of way induces a minimum
sort of literacy, 6 this does not serve other functions. In a techno-
logicMJ:y progressive society, the physical sciences are well developed
and concepts of the nature and operation of the physical world are refined.
The higher degree of literacy makes possible the transmission of these
concepts as well as serving the society in an obvious variety of other
ways.
3.2 The scope of external experience.
3.2.1 The degree of urbanization.
3.2.2 The frequency and range of travel and communication.
3.2.3 The degree of geographic mobility of residence.
The variety of physical phenomena with which the individual
cormes in contact, and the scope of his interactio;n with other persons--
which togetnier may be termed the scope of his external experience--are
primary determinants of his view of the world and his place in it.
Their determinants, in turn, are the degree of urbanization, the frequency
and scope of travel and communication, and the degree of geographic mobility
of residence. These are dependent on common causes, and in a general
way vary together. With respect to communication and travel, the scope
of experience of the elite in a peasat society is greater than that
of the villagers, end it may increase as one moves up the scale of the
elite. With respect to all three phenomena, the scope of experience of
individuals in a technologically progressive society is vastly greater
than that of comparable indiv:duals in peaset- society.
4. Personality structuw.
14l World view.
4.1.1 View of the physical universe.
To the peasant the physical world around him is hardly
less animate than are humans and animals. It operates on him as the
persons around him do, except that it may operate with more force. He
knows that the phys ical !. :vonment Is not subject to control or modifkiation
or improved utilisation by liaman beings, but rather that human, beings
are dominated by it, or at best can maintain harmony with it only by
appeasement af supernatural forces or by right living. His religion
*
See for emple, Robert -Redfield, The Primitive World and Its
TransformaUs'ti (Ithaca, 1953).
is one of gods who intervene in human events and in natural events.
Within his experience he derives theories of cause and effect concerning
the phenomena of nature, but only in a very few isolated sectors of
action is it conceivable to him that he can alter the causal situation
and thereby the effects. (For example, he knows that water is necessary
for growth, and he may have built irrigation systems to control its flow.)
4.1.2 View of social position.
In most societies the villager knows also that he is
a villager, that certain other persons are nobles, landed gentry, or
learned men, and that these class positions are a fixed fact, a characteristic
of the universe. Even in societies where there is ase class mobility,
only a rare deviant villager conceives of being anything but a villager.
In these tio respects, the w rld view of the elite of a peasant society
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is probably very similar to that of the villagers. It is probably true
that to the elite .so, the impact of the physical environment upon
life is in the main regarded as a datum, uncontrollable. Power and
control lie in control of a share of the proceeds of peasant agriculture,
not in economic innovation. To the elite, also, excapt where the society
is in a process of disintegration, the class structure of the society
in a given fact; it is as impossible for them to lose their elevated status
as for peasants to gain it. Within the elite part-society, there may
be fluidity of relative rank, rivalry, and tense competition. While
in an ideal concept of stqtic feudal or caste society all class positions
are fixed, in almost every real life society there has been some mobility
among classes of the elite.
Both aspects of world view differ sharply in a technologically pro-
gressive society. For persons constituting a considerable fraction of
the population, the unconscious frame of reference that determines the
scope of their mental activity includes the concept (or"fact") that the
world can be made to yield increasing fruits by the exercise of their
intelligence. The thinking of all members of the society is based to
some degree on the same unconscious premise. Belief in attainment of
material success through appeasement of supernatural forces has large)r
disappeared. Niany elite no longer believe in supernatural forces. For
martr other persons, a supernat'ural being or beings exist, but affect
only one's spiritual destin and assuage only one's emotional problems.
To mary of the non-intellectual "comion folk," supernatural forces still
seem able to affect the physical world in same degree, but even for them
this belief is a shadowy thing, a memory of things preached long ago,
rather than a vivid part of their daily life.
Members of a technologically progressive society know also that
one's position in society is subject to change as a result of one's
owa activity. (There is an objective difference between the two societies
in this respect; but what is stated here is a different fact, namely
that the world view of individuals is different in the two societies.)
These differences between the two types of society ii.ay be referred
to summarily by saying that "physical world view" is passive in one
case and active in the other, and that "social world view" is passive
in the one case and active in the other.
4. 2 Motivations.
4.2.l Need affiliation-need achievement.
4,2.2 Need dependence-need autonomy.
4.2.3 Need. dominance.
The term motivation is used here in the psycholgist's
sense sf p:sychic need and nwt in the sense of the conscious verbalized
*
purposes which the individml thinks of as his motives. For knowledge
*See henry A. Murray, ,xporations in -ersonalit (New York, 1938),
for a discussion of personality struciure and definitions of the motives
discussed below. There are no uniform definitions and no uniform Olassi-
fication of motives, a nd not all of Murray's definitions will agree
precisely with odne below.
of the motivations of the members of peasant societies we must rely on
deduction from the structure of t he societIr and the roles of individuals
in it., But this circumstantial evidence is strong. So intimate is the
*
For this indirect evidence, see any number of anthropological
village studies, for example, M. C. Yang , A Chinese Villae (INew York,
1945), Jghn Fabree, S Mura: A Ja anese Vill I cago, 1950), and
Robert Redfield, The o M of Yucatan hicago, 1941).
association of the individual in a peasant
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village, from birth onward, with the village group, and so greatly does
the emotional security of his life depend on the approval by the members
of the community of his role in village life and of his ideas and attitudes
that it seems inevitable that he must possess a high degree of need affiliation.*
Need affiliation: need to please friends and to have their affection,
to cooperate with them, to gain sympathtetic response from them to one's
thinking and attitudes.
So dependent is he on the guidance of his elders, first of his family
and later of the village group as a whole, in his introduction to the
economic and social rule of the community, that it seems inevitable that
he must possess high need dependency0  Because of the same influences,
*Heed dependence: need to feel inferior to someone; to have ideas
and attitudes approved by a person or persons regarded as superior, in
order to harbor them. Involveo emotional rejection of thoughts or attitudes
not approved by others.
in a settled peasant village he must be possessed bf low need achievement,*
Need achievement: need to attack new problems, unknowns, subject
to solution by the exercise of intellect (not gamblers' chandes), thus
repeatedly testing one's ability to succeed; need to do difficult jobs.
Involves pleasure at thinking new thoughts, discovering new ways,
autonomy, and dominance, at least with respect to his "non-recreational"
Need autonomy: need to be independent of others, to resist coercion
and restriction, avoid conformity, to do what one wants withogt regard
to what others may O.nk.
*Need dominance: -need to be a leader, to influence others to ace, pt
one's views and to act as one desires, to control others, to give decisions,
to press one's point of view.
roles in the village, including his ecoaomic role. It does not necessarily
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follow that there is no need aggression or related "individualistic"
needs; it only follows that where the rearing of children produces these
as well as need dependency and affiliation there is either conflict,
tension, and frustration within the individual, expresdion of need
aggression in attacks on non-village members, or its expression in
symbolic rather than more substantive ways, or more than one of these.
There may also be high need recoqnition, need dominance, etc., expressed
in ceremonial, religious, or "recreational" activity.*
*Psychologists have as yet little to say concerninC the degree to
which needs ramify throughout the entire personality or on the contrary
are compartmentalized within glven sectors of activity; but there seems
ample empirical circumstantial evidence that certain needs either exist
in an indivIdual with respect to some sectors of activity and not wLth
respect to others, or are expressed solely in some spheres. The difference
between the two possibilities may be merely verbal. Concerning compart--
mentalization, see the discussion of innovators in the next paragraphs
immediately following.
The need structure of personalities of members of the elite in a
peasant society is less clearly defined. In some peasant societies,
and indeed in iost, they may be charactorised by high need achievement
and autonomy, which together impIly low need dependency and affiliation,
and also by high need dominance. In societies where this is true, typically
the occupational values associated with their social position (see Occupational
Values, balow) prevent them from exerciding these needs in economic activity,
and instead cause then to strive in warfare or in ceremonial or other
symbolic activity. It is worth noting specifically that to expect the
dominant social group to lead the society toward higher productivity
because of the "economic motive" is naive. The position of this group
in the social structure is by definition unimprovable; its values point
away from the devotion of energy to study of technology; ,nd its economic
position is superior to that of any other group in the society, so that
no comparison exists to create pressure to improve it. Unless it s sodial
* If man's economic activity were 4aided primarily by an insatiable
desire for more goods, one would expedt the dominant social group to be
the leaders in technological progress in every society, for the members
of this group have the best opportunity to advance. But sociological
studies have made eminently clear that the, influences that govern each
individual's actions are not an abstract desire for more goods,but his
position relative to his fellows. The concept of the "economic man" is
not only unrealistic, but analytically harmful, in this context. The
contrary relativistic position is consistent with the findings concerning
consumer behavior of James S. Duesenberry (Income, Savingand the Theory
of Consumer Behavior (Cambridge, Mass., 1919), Franco Modigliani U!luctuations
in the Saving-Income ilatio," Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume Ten),
and Dorothy Brady Faiily Savings in elation to Changes in the Leve',
and Distribution of Income," Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume Fifteen);
and concerning the influences which motivate the behavior of business
executives, as indicated 1:p a variety of studies.
position is threatened, the top group will not chang. Oeti on V consi,4.
special circumstances wnich may cause certain groups of the elite,
characterized by high need achievement, autonomy, and dominas:ce, to
channel thi.r energies into economic innovation.
The discussion of moAivations in a technologically progressive society
must be limited to innovators, for we know too little about other groups
to generalize. The term innovators needs definition. It includes innovating
business entrepreneurs, but it would be a serious error to think only
of them; innovation is performed also by pure scientists, engineers,
foremen, laborers of many types, individual enterprisers, farmers, political
and social leaders, and govermment administrators, among others. Continuing
rapid advance in productivity will not occur .unless innov4ation is wide-
spread in the ,ionomy among many classes of workers. Concerning the
motivations of innovators in a technologically progressive society, we
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have both persuasive circumstantial evidence and some more or less direct
evidence from sociological and psychological studies.
The esse.ce of innovation is the solution of protlems involving
unknown or unique elements-- the opposite of rote acti:n-and no one
could consistently ane! effectively apply his energies tt the attacking
of problems unless he possessed high need achievement. his reasoning
aI supported by empirical evidence,. The work of Warner and Abrgglen
suggests strongly that the innovating entrepreneur is chart cterized by
high need achievement and high need autonomy, a high degree of need dominance
in some sense, and a high degree of confidence in his own Jutgnent.
*
W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, ness Leades in
America (New York, 1955), and Occupational Nobility in Amercan usiness
and Industry, 192b-1952 (inneapolis, 1955).
The work of Barron indicates that men who possess an unusual degria of
o*iginality, whether or not entrepreneurs, possess this same self-:-onfidence.
From his findings it may be deduced thst they also possess high ne-d
*
achievement and autonmy.
*
Frank Baeron, "The Disposition Toward Originality," in Resear h
Conference on the Identification of Creative Talent(niversit7"T"tT'h
Press, 1955), and "Ori ility in Relation to Personality and Intel'sct,"
mimeo. Institute of ersonality Assessment and Wa.'U Univ, of ali-
N'rnia, Berkeley.
But the need structure of innovators is not as simple as these coments
mWy suggest, Not all innovators manifest high heed achievement and high
need autonomy unalloyed. Lhese needs dominate their behavior only n
some sectors of their lives. 1he sexual activity of J. P. Morgan Ezggests
a constant need to reassure himself that he was big enough to act uri a
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man, and a constant need to be sheltered by his mother. John D. Rockefeller,
Sr. was an extremely conventional man in his home and religious life.
Henry Ford's intense life-long interest in collecting and preserving
things of the past suggests a constant fear of adventuring too boldly
into the new. It is not certain how typical or atypical these instances
are of tt e vast number of innovators grea)t and small who are responsible
for contiiuing technological progress; but the instances indicate that
highly effective innovation may be carried on by individuals in whom need
dependency is mixed with need achievement and need autonomy, and who
gain secur ty by affiliation with or dependency on a group in some spheres
of- activity, thereby gaining freedom to think the more freely in other
spheres.
In the outline above, need affiliation and need achievement are
regarded as at the two extremes of a continuum, and need dependency and
need autonoi y :.kewise. The relationships between the two needs in each
pair are uncou~tedly more complex than this, but this simplification
probably dois iot do violence to the present analysis. 'ibis simplifying
assumption is no bar to regarding a person as characterized by both
high need affliation and high need dependency. It does not mean that
the perein this constituted will be in conflict with himself and under
tensio.. (Ir some small degree, he has a "split persoralitjy".) The
two .eeds may expres, themselves. at different times, in different conteets.
Or the two needs may counteract each other and immobilise the individual.
4.3 Occupational values.
The difference in need structure between the members of a techno-
Logicaly progressive society and those of a technologically static sodiety
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is thus less clear than the difference in world view, though it is
probable that there is also a significant difference in needs. Clearest
of all is the difference in occupational values.
Villagers and elite alike in a peasant society revere the same
economic roles, and spurn the samto onwim. Both W-6 land ownership in
high value-a fact which is not surprising, since land is the predominant
basis of life and livelihood to thb peasant and of income to the elite.
The peasant, if he cannot own land, strives to operate it; his intense
desire to do so bids rents up to the heights denounced in all peasant
societie,.* The status of landed gentry or of manorial lords in all
It is customary to s ay that high rents are due to the rapacity of
landlords, ne t ti the bidding of tenants; but if peasants as a whole, in
any peasant society, chose to be farm laborers unless the income of a
cultivator were appreciably higher than tha+ of a laborer, their lessened
desire for tenancy would automatically lea7e landlords without tenants
until rents were reduned. It takes both Wades of the scissors to cut
the cloth of land temiincy at the point of high rather than low rents.
peasant societies testifies to the possession of a similar love of the
laided life on the part of the elite.
Both villager and elite likewise revere religious position, admire
military position, and respect position in the service of the king-though
to the villager all three are something open only to others, to be looked
at fran afsr, while to the elite all three are possible paths of life,and
the ket two are sought. The religious life is apparently everywhere looked
on as a career for the selected person, the deviant.
Both villager and elite spurn trade and "business". Apparently in every
peasant society, traders (not to be confused with craftsmen who sell their
own wares) are to same degree an outcast class. Often they are a separate
racial group, which has come into the society from another area. And apparently
in every peasant society, when machine production ftrst makes its appearance
the devotion of one's energies to managing
the operation of machines, tending to supplies, and in other ways making
a "shop" operate effectively, is regarded as a disagreeable, pedestrian,
grubby activity, to be spurned unless necessity forces onO to take it
up.
This valuation probably arises out o* an older one, also shared by
elite and villager alike. This is a feeling of repugnance toward unsk -led
manual labor and toward work thqt soils one's hands, or clothing, a feeling
that dirty work is demeaning, if not degrading. In most societies the
peasant apparently does not regard work on the land in this light; its
association with the creativity of nature seems to redeem it.* But to
Though not, apparently, to peasants in many societies around the
'lediterranean. See Eedfield, Peasant Sciety and Culture, o . t.,
Ch. IV.
villager and elite alike, the coolie, the sweeper, the man who deals *idth
grease and dirt, is ignoble., In India, the lowest castes ;re those whose.
occupations are physically or ceremonially dirty. Everywhere, even the
lowly classes shift dirty manual labor to still lower classes, if they
can. As machine production enters the society, this attitude attached
itself to the management as well as the performance of dirty occupations--
and thus diverts energy and imagination from industrial work.
In a technologically progressive society, there is a more diversified
set of attitudes toward various economic roles, Life on Ahe land is not
ke g)y regarded except by the peesons who practice it, and often not even
by them, their failure to shift elsewhere being due to fear of )nknown
life elsewhere rather than to love of the landa Attitudes toward th"
religious life vary, bt by almost all it is regarded as a life for deviants.
-*31-
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Rilitary life holds its glamor, waen there is fighting to do, but in
most such societies war is regarded as unlikely, and life in the armed
forces in peacetirne ras dull. Attitudes toward a life of learning ar=
ambivalent, Government service--the successor to service of the king--0
is looked dti wpon by most classes. Trading is not especially highly
regarded, but for most persons in all social classes "business" has
an aura which contrasts violently with the disesteem in which it is
held in peasant societies. Manal-technical activities are highly estegmed,
and if dirty work is associated with technology, the aversion to it disappears.
This is one of the sharpest contrasts in the entire value system of tie
two societies.
4.4 Other elements of personality structure.
There seems no reason to assume systematic differences between
the two societies with respect to other important elements of personality
structure, Certainly innovating basiness entrepreneurs, and probably
innovators in general, are distinguished by a high level of physical
energy. Lhis may be biugenic, or may be culturally and socially determined.
There is some superficial plausibility in the view that in the countries now
underdeveloped energy levels tiroughout the population may on the average
be lower than elsewhere, because of climate or diet or both, If so, this
may be a barrier to innovation. However, neither climate nor diet explain
tho very late development of the Soviet Union, and climate cannot be
adduced to explain the even later developneitt of much of Latin America,
or that of China (if China is now developing). Whether diet can reasonably
be adduced as a cause in these areas is doubtful. Hence it seems more
plausible to assume that differences in energy level are differences
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among individuals in each society, anti not differences among societies.
Similarly, there is no doubt that innovators, like leaders in other
fields, are on the average more intelligent than the population as a
whole. But there is no reason whatever to assume average differences
among societies in intelligence.
5. "Pattern variables" of interpersonal relationships.
Finally, it remains to discuss certain of the expectations or
attitudes in interpersonal relationships which Parsons has temed the
"pattern variables". Parsons has sketched a set of four (earlier, five)
"pattern variables", which charactise interpersonal relationsnips in
argr society. Two of these are especially pertinent.
*Parsons, conception of the pattern variables arose out of Tonnies'
concept of geminschaft v. gellschaft. Parsons' own concepts evolved
over a period of years. Three of th pattern variables are defined and
illustrated in h- s paper, "The Professions and Social Structure," reprinted
in his Essays in Sociological Theory, rev. ed. (Glencoe, inl., 1954).
Later a fourth and fifth were added. For definitions, see also his
The Social System (Glencoe, Ill., 1951). The pattern varables are put
into a systemetic framework in Parsons and Shile, eds., Toward A General
Theory of Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1951). The statement is somewhat
elaborated, an related to a scheme of "system problems" of Bales, in
Parsons, Hales, and Shils, Working 4apers in the Theory of Action (Gle coa,
In., 1953). In Parsors and Melser, Rconomy nd ociety (London, 96),
the relationship between the "pattern variables" and the "system probleis"
is reformulated, and one of the five pattern variables, self-orientation
v. collectivity-orientation, tor .lf-interest v. disinterestedness) is
eliminated.
5.1 In a peasant village, one's relationships with and attitudes
toward each other person depend in the main not upon what his capabilities
or needs are, but upon who he is. A peasant does not seek the best
worker to hehp him till his fields; without any thought of selection,
he uses members of his family. This identity between family znd production
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unit is apt to be maintained as trade and other forms of economic activity
enter the society, so that associates in these other types of economic
activity !fre also selected, not from aiong all pez'iobo wvlth whom one
has contact, on the basis of their talents, but from among one's relatives.
Within the family group there may be selection on the basis of personal
qualities. It is worth noting that this limitation of the range of pmr sons
from among whom one splects associates is not inefficient in the circumstances.
In view of the limited scope of mutual trust and the concept of community
in peasant societ'i's , this mode of selection of associates is the most
efficient procedure. Enterprises would function less well, not better,
il one frimed buiness associations with "outsiders."
The determination of attitudes and relatLnships toward a person
on the basis of who rather than what he is, of which the instances cited
are conspicuous exaiaples, is tened by Parsons relationship on the bagies
of u (or ascription) rather than on the basis of performance (v
achievement). It characterizes almost all relationships in peasant
society, not only among the villagers bat also among the elite.
In a technologically progressive society also, fanily enterprises
may be staffed on the basis of quality. It has often been assumed that
in more complex enterprises selection of associates and maintenance of
most other personal economic relationships is necessarily on the basis
of personal talents and qualities without regard to who the person is
(i. e, on the basis of performance). In the main, selection is on this
bani.S. However, that predominance of perf a z;e rather than quality as
a selection basis is not a necessary condition for technoldgical progress
or economic success is illustrated by the case of a cottt y in which
technological progress has been remarkable rapid, namely Japan.
While workers in industrial enterprises in Japan are initially selected
pr~lisrily on the basis of performance, they are hired into one or the
ot'iur of the two classes, "those who direct" (educated), and"those who
work" (less educated). Thereafter, no talent or lack of talent will cause
a person to pass fro. one class to the other. Furthermore, once having
joined a firm, an individual never leaves it to Accept employment else-
where for any reason whatever except the complete financial failure and
dissolntion of the firm. No one is e--er discharged o. laid off except
in the same circumstances. Finally, though successive job assignments
do depend on talent, promotion in formal status and salaiy throughout
one's lifetime careetr with the firm is based primarily on age and familr
size, and is essentially independent of achievement.
bee James C. Ategglen, The Japanes Factorf,mimo. (Center for
International StudieE, Cambridge, Hass., 1956).
There practices are an adeptation to industrial life of prac .;es
existini, in pre-industrial Japan. The Japanese case demonstrates that
to a larger extent than has been assumed in the West, elements in the
culture before technological progress begins may prevail thereafte:.,
withoat impeding its progress. Indeed, they may be necessary for its
progress. evertheless, it is a correct general statement that the
egree of asetiption is *uch less, and relationship on the basis of
sch:.evement ;,uch greater, I n a technolog4cally progressive society tan
in peasant society.
5.2 Lhe two types or society differ sharply with respect to diIuseness-
specificit) of relationships. Business relations.ips and all other in ler-
--36-
personal relationships in the village are among individuals and families
who will live in lifelong contact. If the harsh relations of contract
and fixed legal rules were present, and, in their operation, worked
hardship on one of the parties concerned, the bitterness created might
make extremely difficult the continuing intimate contact involved in
village life. Hence contactual relations and fixed law are abjured.
All interpersonal relations are subject to mutual accomodation and ad-
justment according to the ccnsensus of the village elders. As a result,
one's obligations to one's 9bliguiand the demands one can effectively
make upon them are diffuse. They depend upon the generl obligation to
see that no one in the village suffers unduly from' the relationships o, f
village life. The right of any member of an extended family to call
upon any other to share his income is a well-known example of this
diffuseness of rights and obligations. A arnilar diffuseness (though
not the samne degree of claim) prevails more generally with respect to
all relationships in the village.
As between elite and peasmt, diffuseness in relations is also common
(for example, in the patron--client relation which prevails in many societies,
or relationiip of noble to retainer of peasant); and it extends over
many of the re3ationships among the elite. Custom prevails; and while
custom sometimes takes on the rigidity of contract, more often the customary
relationship is some sort of mutual help arrangement.
Some diffuseness of relationship pr-vails in technologically progressi1ve
societies as well. Not only are diffuse relationships universal within
the family unit; their persistence in some technologically progressive
societies is much broader than this. In some such societies, contracts
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do not have the binding force or the widespread use which they have in
for example the United States; rither, informal agreements subject to
mutual adjustment are used, even in some in.dustrial relationships.*
This statement is based on conversations of the writer with
individuals from various countries. Japan and Colombia are cases in
point.
But in general relationships are much more specific than in peasant societies.
These five groups include all of the variables, which seem functionally
related to virtually stationary technology on the one hand* and continuing
The virtually stationary technology referred to is that which his-
torically precedes continuing technological gdvande. It is conceivable
that continuing technological progress will be followed historically by
a new period of ersentially stationary technology, as the energies of
societies turn to other sorts of a ctivities. The adequacy of the model
presented here to forecast such a developi-nt, when the exogenous forces
which' intervene in real life at sore time in t he future are applied to
the model, would be a test of its validity as a general model of technO-
logical change.
technological progress on the other.* The transition from peasant to
iapiy social scientists would stab that for the purpose of the
present paper, differences between the two societies with respect to the
deterinants of population growth must be included in the model. Concerning
this, see the appendix to this paper.
technologically progressive society involves a shift of the value of
each of the variables in these five groups. As a basis for analy-ing
how these shifts can occur, it will be well to analyze the functional
relationships among these variables in a peasant society.
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IV. The Functiomw1 Relationships.
All of the characteristics of socLety discussed in Section III are
quantitative in nature; they e;ist in some degree which is conceptually
maeasurable. For many of them . the measxreiiient would be ordinal rather
thecn cardinal in nature Most of them are one-dimensional only, at
least in the simplified farm in which they are presented, here, and
measurement is apprcpriately conceived of along a line--from low to
higher output per caplta, from quality to performance, from high need
dependency (conceived of a s negative need achievement) to high need
achievement, etc. Some, e.g. ":he composition of output and the 3,ope
of external experience, are multi-dimensional; to handle them in one
dimension, it would be necessary to construct an index representative
of the change in the complex. I shall not do so, since my discussion
of the functional. relationships among themi is only verbal, and for
verbal presentation the formal translatior into one dimensiun is not
necessary. The verbal presentation could readily be translated into
a set of equations in mtathematical symbols, bu# since we do not know
the precise shape of the functions and cannot solve the' set of equat ffons,
no purpose would be served. It is important, however, to realize that
the argument deila w ith changes in tho magnitude (value, degree) of
quantitative forces, so that discussion of the degree of change in one
variable (or characteristic) resulting from a given degree of change in
others is possible. The underlying a3s3umption S a irechanistic or
probabilistic world, in which every event has conceptuelly deteirinabl)
causes and effects,
For simplicity, in discussing functional rolationships I shll us
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causal terminology, referring in turn to the value of each variable as
resulting from the values of various others at the time period or in
previous time periods. My concrete references in discussing the ralation-
ships will be almost altogether to peasant society, but the same functional
relationships apply in technologically progressive society. The relation..
ships are "assumed", rather than "observed", since the discussion relates
to an analytical model, not to all of the ccplexities of real life.
However, the assumptions concerning the functional relationships are
based on empirical observation and the model is presented tentatively
as embodying essential characteristics of life and as useful in analysing
historical developnent, past and future. I shall discuss the determinants
of the value of each variable in the order in which the variables are
presented in Secti,.n II, except that I shall discuss the level of scientific
knowledge and t he level of techniques together, since they have common
causes.
The level of scientific knowlddge and the level of techniques depend
basically on the accumulation of scientific and technical knowledge in
the past. Scientific and teeinical knowledge are interrelated: not onl-y
does increase in scientific knowledge make possible improved techniques;
improvement in techniques also leads to new scientific understanding.
Ihe level of both is low in a peasant society because of little "accumulation"
in the past. The level of techniques depends also on the size of the market.
The rate of progress in both is due jointly to tie size of the base
*
of accumulated knowldge, the scope of external experience,and the share
*
Every invention or sciellaific discovery is a combination of previously
existing ideas. The larger th'r number and the more basic the nature of
existing scientific ideas, the larger is the nu.iber of possible new
advances. The possible number of new combinations of ideas increases
vastly more rapidly than the increass in the accumulated stock of know-
ledge. With two items, only one cuzmbination is possible; with three,
four; with four, eleven; with five, twenty-six. Technological advance
frequent enough to cunstitute a coitinuing flow becomes more and more
feasible ;as the increase in scientific knowledge accelerates*
of the energies of the members of the society devoted to scientific
and technical advance. The share of the society's dnergies devoted to
this purpose depends in turn on physical and social world view; the
value placed on "business", manual-technical activity, and toil; the
sttucture of needs; the pattern variables; nd the structure of class
relations. In a peasant society, submissive physical world view and
passive social world view make the study of the physical world purposeless.
The low value placed on business, manual-technical retivity, and toil
create aversion to it. Hirih need affiliation and high need dependency
create inner blocks to the freedom of thought which is necessary fof
increase in knowledge or improvement in techniques. If a person explores,
he may venture ideas or modes of behavior which would be unacceptable
to the individual or group with which he associates himself, and ;ohose
values are emotional yardsticks that he carries with him. Hence mental
exploration is uncomfortable. Moreover, by independent thought he would
be rivaling the person (or persons) to whor. he must feel dependence for
comfort, and such rivalry is forbidden b: his need for dependency.
The stress on quality rather than performance as the basis for
person-l relationships may or may not have a deterrent effect on interest
but
in the physical world;/at best it provides no positive basis for such
interest. ihe diffuseness of one 's obligations to one 's faid ly and to
comunity groups requires one to spend one 's energies in conventional
ways. To divert time and energy to strange activitie-s such as observing
nature or tinkering with tools, lest:ens one's time available for performing
the economic, religious, a nd other ceremonial performances expected of
one, and in addition indicates one's low valuation of those duties. It
thus leads to social disapproval. Such use of one's energies may be
regarded as undignified, sacrilegious, "queer"; it may meet with laughter,
contempt, social ostracism.
Fiially, the class structure creates barriers to technological change.
Any impvrtant economic innovation is apt to alter relative social position.
Feudal lords, guilds, a landed gentry, absentee landlords, or a moneylending
class mnakr be injured by technological change and t he changes in relative
power accompanying 1J. The greater the power of such groups to block
adverse changes, the greater the deterrence to the commencement of techno-
logical Irogress.
The determinants of other components of the struciire of productio n
are less cmtplex. Given the country's natural resources, t'e# composition
of output spends on the level of techniques ger capi income, dnd the
size of tta market on the structure of class relationships at the time
and in pa t periods,
*
It depends in part on the pattern of foreign trade, but this in
turn, giren the country's natural resources, is determined by the structure
of clast relations at the tive and past periods.
The raf3 of saving and investment depends on world view, motivations and
value, and the degree of concentration of control of production. The
corpcition of investment depends on the level of techniques, the rate
of c.ange in techniques, the structure of production, the structure of
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class relations, and on the deteninants of the rate of saving and investraent.
The geographic scropof the economic community depends in part on t he
level of techniques and income and the cor;position of output; in part
on the geographic scope of the experience of the vembers of the society;
and in part Qn the degree of national political unity. The higher the
level of income, the greater the division of labor; and the more varied
the corposition of output, the more intense will be the search for a
national miarket. * The wider the geographic soope of experience of the
*The reverse relationsaip--the size of the market as a determinant
of the division of labor, co%-pos..4;in of output, and level of income--
is a .ore important one.
m.eubers of a society, the greater will be their ser.e of national community
and their desire for national economic (and political) un~', The greater
the degree of national political unity, the greater will be the tendency
to have a national economy, with a national market and uniform national
economic rules of the game. These three influences are closely interrelated.
For example, as is suggested on page 42, the geographic scope of the
individual's experience depends on the degree of urbanization, the frequency
and range of travel and communication, and the geographic mobility of
residence, but these in turn depend in considerable part on the level of
er cagita income and the composition of output.
One of the three causal factors mentioned, the degree of wvional
political unity, depends in part on the others, but in large part must
be regarded as a product of influences outside the scope of this analytical
model. The degree of national political unity is of great importance for
economic growth. Technological progress requires a wider market than the
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local ones of peasant society, and requires also assurance againot capricious
and arbitrary treatment of property and person, and these things depend
on nationhoodthough they do not necessarily follow from it. But the
degree of national political unity is determined by forces interwoven
thruughout the entire web of national and international life, and must
be tqken in the analytical model presented here as an "exogenous" factor---
one dw#.-srmined by forces outside the model.
The structure of class relations, given the biogenic distribution
of intelligence and energy aiong the Lm-emabers of the society, depends on
the level of techniques and the rate of change in them; th- structure
of pruduction; the nature of world view, motivations, and values; power
re.at.ons and class structure in past periods, which in turn depend on
the variables mentioned in each period, In a peasant society, the low
level of techniques and lack of cham in them result in lack of opportunity
for change in th- economic position of individuals. The level of techniqes
and t ie composition of output breed no middle class. Submissive physical
world view, passiv' social world view, high need affiligtion and dependency
and low need dominance among villagers, and low valuation on "techno-
logical" occupations, are all conducive to the development of a latge
%9Cial gap between villagers and elite, *-nd to concentration of political
and economic cuntrol in a small elite0
The scope of the in ividual's external exper ence depends on the
degree of urbanizAtion, the frequency and range of communication and
travel, and the geographic mobility of residence. These differ between
the elite arid the non-r-lite, but, for both classes, each of the three
depends on the degrea of political and social centralization, the volume
of (domestic and foreign) trade, rand the volume of travel for its own
sake; these in tira depend on the structure of class relations, the level
of per cap%'a imcome, and the coposition of output. While the relatt n-
ships are complex, it is not a serious distortion to assume that the
scope of external experience of each individual depends unambiguously
on the structure of class relations, the level of per capita income,
=4240
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and tne cauposition of output. In g peasant society, all of these have
such values that the scope of individual experience is very limited.
One's personality structure is formed by the influences which impinge
on one from infancy onward. As a basis for speculation about the social
variables which, given the biogenic characteristics of the individual,
determine personality, it will be desirable to sketch in simplified form
what psychologists know abouit pi-'sonality formation.
As an exa ple of the forces determining personality, consider specifically
the inculcation in an individual of achievement motivation, or the n1ed,
for one's pleasure and satisfaction to attack repeatedly problems in which
success is uncertain, and is dependent on the solution of unknown
difficulties by the exercise of or.e's abilities. In this performance
an achievement-motivated individual strives to mteet an internalized or
"built-in" standard of excellence.*
*Achievement motivation has been studit by David C. Mc Clelland
and his nssociates, See David C. NcClelland, John W. Atkinson, Russell
A. Clark, arid Edgar L. Lowell, The Achievement Hotive (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953).
Social psycilogists ate now well aware of th" general nature of
the processes b,, which this and other motives may develop. Parent-child
relationships and relationship, among siblings are of crucial impetance.
For exat-ple, a baby finds that his mother does things whichaatisfy his
viscerogenic needs, e.g., hunger, desire for a corifortable temperature,
and deuilre for a dry skin. Because his *other is the source of all
that is good, he may coume to fe-,1 satisfaction in her mere presence, and
tension (anxiety) in bhAr absence. By a further association, he may feel
satisfaction and s curity in her approval and anxiety in her disapproval.
As he grows, he will find repeated occasion to explore an unknown
environment. If when ha does so--when he toddles, plays boisterously,
wanders down thn block, tries to -us^ his own knife, tries to dress himself,
wars on his playmates o makes his own truce with them--he senses in his
mother a repeated attitude of fear at venturesome action, or disapproval
at his initial ineptness or at the inconvenience he causes her, he may
come to feel tension in any independent action, and to feel security
and comfort in dependence on her. If, on the contrary, she lets him
face tasks alone at as early a date as he is physiologically ready to
master them, rejectshius plea for help if he turns to her for help , and shows
pride and love in his successful self-reliance, he may come to feel the same
secur.ty and ermotional satisfaction in meeting new problems "on his own"
that he felt as a baby when his hunger was satisfied or his skin soothed,
The rblationship of the child to his father and siblings is like-
wise vital. For example, suppose that a growing boy is dominated by
a strong father, If he acts independently or cor.petes with his father
for his mother's attention, he may come to experience rebuke, rejection,
and impotence, to 'fear acting boldly "like a man", and to feel that ihe
only emotionally safe course is to wait for guidance. The futility of
rivalry with older sibl ngs way produce simiiilar effects.
Of course, opposite results of the use of one's initiative in one's
early years will produce opposite effects.
The individual. is similarly influenced by his relations with his
playmates and othkr early associates. He is influenced by his reading,
the radio, television, and the movies, anti, indeed, by all of his associations,
by the age of say eight years, as a result of all of these influences,
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there will usually be built ini' an individual a degree of boldness
or timiAity in thought and action, self-reliance or dependence, com-
petitiveness or its lack, a degree of positive or negative motivation
toward achievement, which will detemine mai aspects of his behavior,
It is thought that later factors are much less influential in altering
one's motives, although of course every experience throughout life has
some influence.* the typical individual has within him some degree of
*For an acalysis of the development of the individual, full of pro-
fessional insight and wisdom, see Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society
(Sew York, 1950).
drive both toward "achievement" and toward dependency.
Need achievement has been discussed here as an example. However,
the influences indicated obviously also determine the other components
of personality structure. While I have sketched an example in whi6h
causal influences ran in a fairly simple way fram the behavior of parents,
siblings, and others, to a personality trait incnlcated in the individual,
the actual process is so copplex and research in it to date so limited,
that psychologists have very little to say about the personality traits
that will result from a given constellation of circumstances, which
impinge immediately upon the individual as he grows up. They have even
acCleiland's studies of the origins of need achievement are an exception.
less to say about the effects of any given general constellation of cir-
cumstances in the society or within certain groups upon the formation of
p!sonality in successive ganerations.
I have asserted on pages 25 and 26 above that the uircumstances of
life in peasant society necessarily inculcate certain motivations.
I believe this to be highly plausible, in view of the knowledge about
the process of motive formation summarized immediately above. Village
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members who behaved independently, and reected guidance, even when young,
would in loost peasant societies be subject to such rejection and evo t na
shock that the inculcation in almost nll villagers of high need affiliation
and need dependency, and low need achiexement, autonomy, and dominance
seems very probable. If t Ais is correct, these motivations depend in
a complex way on the nature of peasant life, i.e., on many of t.ie other
variables in the syste;p. It must be recognized that the specific effects
sketched here are speculative, and have not been verified empirically.
It is clear, however, that motives are formed by the naure of all of
interpersonal contacts one has as one ,rows from infancy--by the kind
of persons one's parents and siblin)s and others are and the nature of
tensions among them, rather than by the precepts they preacht, Thus u=tives
depend in a complea way on the entire social structure and its history
during previous generations. More formally, the need structure inculcated
in an individual deo ends on his own world view and value system, the
scope of his scientific knowledge and external experience; and on the
values at the time and in past periods of: the personality structure
of other individuals; the pattern variables; and the structure of clas
relations. The results of these influences, in a peasant society , have
been suggested in Section III.
The world view of the individual, like his motivaticns, is formed,
~at by a logical mentgl process, but by his emotional readtions to the
influenees which impinge on him as he -rows up. But it probably derives
at second hand largely from the objective facts of life. To a great
extent the view on oneself in a peasant society as within nature and
subject to its control, rather tihan as able to influence its effects,
probsbly derives from the impact on one 's social environment of the
objective fact tnat in the prevailing circumatances of knowledge an(,
technique one is subject to and helpless before thr forces of nature.
The view is simple realism, for both )easant and elite. The peasant's
view of his social position as beyond his cortrol is probably derived
similarly from the impact on him as hP grows up of the fact that this
is true. In formal terms, the world view of the individual depends on
his motivqtions and values; the scope of his sciesi8.fic knowledge and
external experience; and on the values at the time and in past periods
of: the world view of other individuals; the stwu0d:'e of class relation-
ships; the level of techniques; and. the composition of output, including
specificall 'his own occupation. The value of these variables in a peasant
society is such as to create passive physical world view and passive
social world view in peasant and also, in somewhat lesser degree, in elite.
In a way indicated in Section V, below, physical world view is peculiarly
dependent on the scope of individual experience, and moves from passive-
ness to eive as that experience widens.
What influences determine the value in which vue holds various
occupations or economic roles? The method of inculcation is no doubt
similar to that of motives and world view, An individual feels satis-
faction in a given activity or occupation, not for the logica "reason"
that he may advance, but primarily bacause the -ctivity of occupation
recreates in him feelings of security and pleasure that he felt as an
infant or a child.
In part these derive from his need structure in combination with
the rewards offered by various economic roles. If one occupation offers
greater opportunity than another for satisfaction of needs that characterize
the individual--needs for achievement, aitonomy, affiliation, dependency,
dot~naa-ie, aggression, sex, recognition, or any of a number of others-
th'- iidividual will be correspondingly attracted or repelled.
*
For interesting relevant empirical research, see McClelland,
David C., in Research Confernce on the Identification of Creative
lalent op. Oit.
.3 lo probable that a boy directly acquires a favorable
Set*tgehnwrt to zom activities or occupations, anid discomfort
in others, from the contentment of his parents (or other early associates
whose emotional reactions offect him strongly) in some situations, their
reverence or res)ect for somrie persons or syobols, their antipathy to
others. Or, depending, on the nature of his relationship to his father,
he may have an aversion to his father's occupation becayse he dares not
rival his father, or because he rebnls against his father. These reactions
too derive from the person's need structure in combinatio-n with the rewards
offered by various economic roles, so in a sense they are merely special
cases of the hypothesis stated in the precedinL paragraph.
In a peasant society, land is the basis of life and livelihood.
The intense need to own or control it is no doubt "inherited" from generation
to generation in the ways suggested above; but it did not originate in
the distant past in a random or ;ccidhen1 high valuation on land. Rather
it is no doubt rooted in a sensible observation of the crucial importance
of land. Over the generations, this sense of the advantage of landedness
imparted to land ownership or operation a social prestige which came to
have a force of' its own,and which explains the high and economically
irrational vallation of landedness characteristic of almost every agri-
cultural society.
Military service and thp service of th' king; are the main secular
activities which provide hope of rising in social status. Each is endowed
with high status by its relationship to the ting or chieftain. Over the
generations these facts no doubt imparted high prestige to both. mach
has the further attraction for certain of the elite of being an outlet
for need power and need aggfession.
The forces which give prestige to religious office and traditional
learning are probably more complex. They need nol be discussed here,
except to suggest why traditional learning, rather than study of the
physical world, is revered. The fort er may be of use in appeasing
unseen forces, whereas the latter is ussless. The forier is reserved
for the elite who have time to pursue it, whereas the latter is Associated
with toil. hence class structure and the low level of knowledge combine
to lead toward elevation of the one and derogation of the other.
Why the virtually universal derogation of trade in peasant societies?
Anthropologists have suggested that the production of goods, out of the
fertile earth or by handicraft, is an extend.on of one's personality.
One enters into the products. Trading in thema is ther4?. like selling
for gain one's spirit. To this hypothesie may be added the suggestion
that &rade, by putting man against t.an in economic cumbat, threatens the
mutual accommodation which is a basis of life, and hence is to be feared.
Whatetar tho true explanation, this attitude is woven into the fabric
of peasant life.
And why the universal distaste for dirty work? It perhaps stems
larL;ely from the fact that in peasant society dirty work is associated
onlr with low-income yielding occupations, and thus with low position
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in the class structure. The intensity with which the attitude is felt
suggests acme further reason, deeply woven into the emotional reactions
of the individual's early life, but I a not able to suggest what it
may be.
To summarize in a formal manner the functional relationships thus
illustrated, the occupational values of the individual depend on his
motivations and world view; the scope of his scientific knowledge and
external experience; and on t ie values at the time , nd in rast periods
of: the personality structure of other individuals; the structure of
class relationships; the leveI4 of techniques; and the coriposition of
output, including specifically his own occupatiob.
Finally, what factors determine the pattern variables which will
characterize th+ intpersnal relations of a society? The presence of
diffuseness in interpersonal relatiohs and of quality rather than per-
formance as a basis for interpersonal relations within peasant villages
results In part from continuance throughout life of face-to-face relation-
ships with the same group of persons. Such a situation tends to cot:.pel
mutual adjustment and accommraodation' rather than the control of relations
by legal rule and contract, an- tends also to include the selection of
those persons with whoi one is most closely associated throughout the
weekly arid yearly round as one's associates in eccnor.ic and other relation-
ships, rather than selection on the basis of pai.ionaance. Ihis closeness
of the village group in turn results from the factors which cause the
geogrqphic mobility and the scope of communication and travel to be slight.
Also, the constancy of techniques reduces the problev of training and
the need to face new problems, and tessena the need for selection on the
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basis of performance. Further, the nature of the personality structure
reinforces the tendency toward differences and relationships based on
quality. Somewhat similar influences within the closed circle of the elite
account for the presence of the smae pattern variqbles in lesser degree
among the elite. Long,-continued personal relationships and interdependence
between given families of the elite and given families of the mass, result-
ing from the rigidity of the economic structure, tends to result in similar
relationships between the two groups.
Conversely, the development in technologically progressive societies
of impersonal economic relrtionships with individuals one does not know,
the divorce of interpersonal consumer relatirnships from business relation-
ships, and the increased complexity of businesF relationships, and the
greater fluidity of consumer life, all conduce to specify of relotions
and to the use of performance as a basis for them.
Thus the pattern variables of a society depend on the level of
techniques and the rate of their change, the composition of output, the
scope of communic3tion and travel, and the georiphic mobility of resi-
dence. As the discussion above sug-csts, the variables of our analytical
model are interlocked with each other by powerful links. In a peasAnf
society, so strongly does the interrelation of all of the vatiables
tend to perpetuate the prevailing value of each that it is reasonable
to regard peasant society a a system of extremely stable slowly moving
equilibrium, and to put the question of change in this farm: That forces
could possibly be strong enough to drive the system into crntinuing
technological change?
V. The Dynamics of the Transition.
Five possible forces tending to cause change in the structure and function-
ing of peasant society suggest themselves. The first is the creeping
progress of understanding of the physical world and of technology, whose
cumulative effects rmtay radically alter the functioning of the society.
The second is social tensions among the elite. It has been suggested
in Section III that high need achievement, aggression, and dominance
may exist among the elite of a peasant society and that the effects of
possible tensions amiong elite groups merit exploration.
The remaining three are forces which may impin1e on the society
from without. One is pressures which may thraaten the structure of
social rela tionships within the society; the s econd is altered economic
opportunity; aryl the third i Iiposition of change in the society's
structufN and functioning by physical force, via in the extreme case
colonial rule. Another force from without, simpl the impact of new
ideas, has been stressed by saie writers, but it is easy to exa.gerate
greatly the impact of ziere verbal notions. Except as thdy affect techno-
logy and are included within the first force mentioned above, mere verbal
notions are apt to be of much effect only if they suggest methods of
implementing changes for which pressures already exist in the society.
Consideration of the functional relationships offecting the other
variables discussed above suggests that none of them is apt to change
exogenouc ly and thus be an initiating factor in social change. The
scope of external experience is apt to change only if techniques improve
or class relationships alter. In the absence of some prior disturbing
factor, neither the elite nor the villagers are apt to initiate change
in the structure of class rela tionships. The pattern variables are apt
to change only as a result of change in interpersonal relationships.
Personality structure, it has been suggested, derives frov t he natme
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of the situation about the individual as he L;rows up, and cannot change
in the absence of change in that situation. It is true that there will
always be some individuals of deviant personality structure in any
society, if for no other reason than because or randosm events which
create unique pressures 0. various moments in the lives of various indi-
viduals. But virtually eveory peasant society has special roles for its
deviants-for examiple, special religious office, homosexuality, or simply
a role as the village fool--which pemit them to exist without disturbing
social relations in general; and virtually every society is insulated
against any impact on social norms by deviants in personality. As a
result, a general social change is not apt to occur as a result of the
appearance of an occasional deviant personality.
Weber and others have suggested a r-ligious ethic of a certain kind
*
as a moving force. deligious beliefs, however, are s part of a social
* lhe standerd reference is to kax Weber, The Protestart Ethic and
tht-Spirit of C.itlism, translated by T. Parsons (New York, 194b).
See also writings of A, H. Tawney and 4. Sprbart. For evidence of the
religious beliefs of scientists in England in the seventeenth century,
see Robert K. lierton, "Science, Religion, ,nd Technology in the Seven-
teenth Century England," Osiris, 1936, Vol. IV.
group's "projective system". That is , they are not arrived at merely
or prizrarily by an intellectual process, but are a projection of the
person's emotional needs into his structure of beliefs. They arise from
the tensions created by the total functioning of the social systemand
cannot vary independently of that systm. Hence the concept of a ce tain
type of religious belief as a "first cause" or emagenous cause of econo-
mic development is mistaken, though religious belief can be a powerful
1"carrier" of needs and can have a .owerful "feedback" ef fect.
Jne further preliminary observation: whatever t he initiating
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force is, 1_. will not bring about a change from creeping tqchnological
progress to continuing technological progress withott an intervening process
of gradual change in the values of all of the variables of the Podel
presented above. The techniques of peasant society cannot chance in a
drastic and widespread manner until the individual's view of his relation-
snip to the world changes radically, scientific knowledg;e a nd o'. -cope
of many individuelU! external experience widen greatly, occupational
values undergo basic alteration, class relationships alter in their social,
economic, and political aspects, ad the values of the puttern variables
change considerably. these changes need not of course occur for every
indididual in the society. But for widespread teci.nological change--
raising cvnsiderably the productivity of the economj as a whole--they
must change markedly for so many individuals that the structure and
functioning of the entire society are, greatly altered. What must be
sought for, therefore, is not forces which can introdute continuing
technological change into a peasant society, IV forces which can cumula-
tively alter the society until it ceases to be a peasant 'ociety and
becodes a tehenologically progressive society.
Indeed, drastic change in t he value of fa one vadjbze tn a peasabt
society while the others remain at their peasant society leve' seems
*
unlikely. Xhe entire set of values rNist probably shift in coniiderable
It has been suggested that high need achievement way appear .brughout
a peasant society, and is consisten t with persistance of the peasant society
structure. This is conceivable, and if so provides an exception to the
generalization. In the absence of circurustqnces in which achiverent.
in technoleg# seems possible and worth while, high need achieve.ent iwoht
lead not to technological progress but to reb illion or the establishmerA
of an evpire; or, without causing alteration of t he peasant society, it
mnight lead to a high degree of accomplishment in a rchitecture, philosophy.
athletics, or art, or to the elaboration of local ceremony. Clifford 3eer'z,
an anthropologist who has spent two years in Java, states that a very
limited amount of psychologicaltesting there suggests tentatively that
high need achievement is common among Indonesians. Up to the present
time, there is no indication that it has channeled itself into economic
development.
degree, though of course not equally, before any of them can shift dras-
tically. The system of variables, not simply one variable at a time,
must undergo changing values. This suggests the difficulty, though not
the impossibility, of t he occurrence of the entire set of changes within
a fairly short time, say one generation.
*The changes in the Manus society related by Margaret Mead in New
Lives for Old (New York, 1956) raise a question about the soundness of
this generalization. I believe that the apparent contradiction is not
real. If the case of the Manus is an exception to the generalization,
it is a limiting case, extremely unlikely to be duplicated elsewhere.
With this introduction, consider the forces suggested above as
possible initiators of general change.
Occasional technological -or scientific advance may occur in any
society in two ways; first, the more or less random action of intelligent
minds may bring discovery of improved methods. Secondly, some of the
*
deviant individuals who appear in any society may have deviant ideaa_
A tem which includes Alexander the Great, Spinoza and Henry Ford,
as well as village fools and t inkerers,
about the physical world, or may turn their energies to problems of
technology. ±"rom time to timue, therfore, new truths awout the physical
world will be discovered, aird new techniques will be devised. Some of
these, because of their use involves change wich runs sharply counter to
attitudes and values in the society, may hot be adopted, but some will
be. Over time, there will be occasional ctechnological advances..
These advances may bring increased productivity, trade, and travel
If they do, they may initiate basic changes in world view. One aspect
of the world view of the members of peasant society has been stated
above as the view that they are within nature and subject to its contol.
It may be restated as follows: that the forces which control life are
arbitrary and willful, and that the will involved is beyond the control
of man's intelligence. This is the peasant view, a nd the view of elite
has not moved far from it.
Godfrey and kionica Wilson9, in their interesting little book on
The Analysis of Social Change , have suggested that an essential cause
*Op. cit.
of change in this aspect of world view is an; expansion of "the scale of
the society," by which they mean what I would prefer to term a n expansion
of the "scale of the community". An essential aspect is what I have
referred to as broadening of the "scope of external experience" of the
individual. But in the slow progress of the society, as the individual
becomes more mobile, he sees different effects occurring in different
circumstances, and with regard to a widening circle of events he may
see that the differences in events are due to differences in physical
circumstances, not to the will 9' the gods. In primitive society he
discovered that searks or friction, nct merely Vulcan, cause fire.
In peasant agriculture, he discovered that water and soil affect growth,
and learned to plow, irrigate, and transplanto As he becomes more mobile
and sees an increasing variety of circumstances, the area of physical
phenomena subject to the will of the gods shrinks at an increasing rate,
and the area subject to Pian's control expands.
This plausible guess concerning the effects of a broadening scale
of contacts is based, in the case of the Godfreys, on observation of number
of African comirunities. If it is correct, the slow growth in the scale
of coxmunication, geographic mbility, and urbanization which may be-.
expected in any peaset society as technology slowly changes--or the
disruptions caused by warfare or population i.ovem;ents--will tend to
accelerate change in the individ1il's view 6f his relation to nature.
This change in world view, toward taking for granteli the operation
of understandable cause and effect in an increasingly large area of the
phenomna of the physical universe, is of course the basis of advance
in science. The two reinforce each other Change in world view may
lead also to change in occupational values. By giving a sense of mastery,
it i.ay pave the way Alao for higher need achievement an need autonomy.
Further, the ubs'rvation of even small differences in custom in different
cormtiunities may suggest that the relations of Ufe in one's own community
are not an inevitable part of the world, and may help to break the "cake
of custom" and free the mind for other social changes.
Out of these considerations, a total thetJy of the transition to
continuing technological change can be built. With the accuimulation
of sciiW 'ic and technological knowledge, the rate of discovery of new
techniques will accelerate, simply because there is a growing body of
ideas in existence to be combined into new ones. New advances will be
*
See footnote on pages 39 and 40, above.
easier. The prospect will increase that the devotion of evergy to science
or technical innovation will be fruitful. As it does, the balance of
attractiveness between various activities will gradually shift, even if
traditional roles and activities remain alItV;ely as attractive as
before. Thus a steadily increasing number of individuals, and ultimately
large groups, will delote their energies to the new activities. Appropriate
changes in economic and social institutions will be induced. The trickle
of technological progZress will become a rivuleto, a current, and finally
a rushing tide.*
"We may assume that the number of scientific vants doubled in
the fifteenth century (fromt the fourteenth) and tra 1. in the sixteenth
9 moderate assumption; the increase was probably much larger)".
George Sarton, preeminent historian or science, in his Six Wings, (Indiana
University .Lress, 1957), pp. vi.
This theory is appealing in its simplicity. But it is not sufficient
to give us even a rough explanation of historical developments. It suggests
a gradually accelerating rate of technological progress, This, however,
does not seer. to have been the typical course of development. Indeed,
such inexact historical knowledge as is available suggests that it may
not have been the sequence anywhere. Even in Britain, the countries of
the three areas
Western Europe, ica. the developing Latin Amnerican countries where the
transition has been the smoothest, a surge of change rather than gradual
acceleration, seems the appropriate description for the last stage in
the trankition.
The United States, Australia, New Zealand, and canada do not
provide evidence on either side of this point, fof technological progress
did not appear in these countries by transition from pre- industrial
societies previously existing there. These cases are rather to be regarded
as offshoots of the Industrial Revolution in Britain.
It is true that the concept of a sharp break in the development of
those countries--a point in time after which there was rapid technological
progress and before which there was not--is more myth than reality. In
each case the point in time commonl? cited is the point when technologisal
progress became conspicuous and began to be written about. The record
of industrial output in each case, an such evidence concerning total
output as is available, show an accelerating curve with no sharp change
of direction at any point. But the error is only one of degree', The
historical record gives the ii.pression more of pent-up forces breaking
out than of gradual acceleration, and suggests that the forces determining
the timing in the transition are not adequately described in termis of
gradually accelerating change.
The concept runs into especial difficulty in explaining the transition
in Japan, that in the Soviet Union, or those Qhich seei;. to be under way
at present in China and India. In Japan and the Soviet Union, rapid
technological advance was inaugurated by a climaotic social upheaval
And the coming inte, power of a new government eager to further technical
progress. The same will have been true in China and India, if the present
period in these countries proves to be the final stage of the transition.
It is true that these social revolutions mnay be explained as results of
a rising tide of technological change, but in this case the theory becomes
such a vague generalization, incapable of explaining or being dinproved
by historical events, as to be of little use unless we add to it further
apparatus which will explain why technolo'gical progress brought the
transition when and as it did.
In England, Western Europe, and the Latin American countries that
are now progressing, as well as in Japan and the Soviet Union, the final
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surge was carried forward, niut by individuals saattered at random among
the elite, but by individuals kelonging in each case to a selected group
or groups. 1hese groups were distinguished in significant ways from the
elite as a whole or the population aa a whole. In England the group
wqs the Jonconfonnists, Scotbh and other; in Japan, lower order Samurai,
upper level peasants, and a few merchants; in Colombia, the people of
hedellin and more generally of Antioquia; in Sao Paulo, selected groups
of immigrants and internal migrants; and so on. These facts raise the
question whether technol~gical progress would have become rapid when it
did, in any of these countries, if circumstances had not caused an
imp.rcaat group to channel its energies into econonic activity. 1he
facts suggest diving attention to the social tensions among the elite
as a caus. of change. POne relevant role of a group is easy to discern.
In the discussion of motivations, in Section III, the pressures against
nonconforidty in a peasant society were sketched. they are equally great
in any stable society. They are sufficient to keep any but a rare
devant individual from engaging in abnormal activities. But if some
social pressure causes an entire group to favof the new attitudes, and
the new fom of a.ctivity, the approbation of the group will shield its
mvbers fromt the psychological consequences of the disapproval of he
larger society. The individual, though deviant with respect to the larger
society, is not deviant with respect to his group--and it is the latter
relatiunship which is Most important to him. This group effect I term
the "principle of group protection."
I have suggested in Section III* %y the dominant social group in
Page 26
a society will not lead the way to change (unless change seemso to offer
protection against a threat to its !ubinance). To lead, howeter, a group
will have to be a relatively elite tne. In part this is because a peasant
grouip or other coi.parable lower class group is much lest apt (nutil the
trantition has been completed and technological values are dominant in
the society) to acquire a world view which will lead it to vigorous action
in science and technology--a view of the physical world and social position
as contrllable through one's own efforts. It is also because the intro-
ductiun of changing technology will require social changes which only
a relatively elite group can bring abcut, and will require "lumps" of
cppital which only members of an elite grcup will be able to draw together,
In England, the social changes included the extensicnof the joint stock
company deviee, originally created for international trading ventures,
to all varieties of domestic business, and the authorization by Parliament
of enclosures. In Japan, they included the abolition of feuel'sl governiiental
forms and the creation of a national governmient. In kussia, the i.potence
of the ruling roup and the social disorder of war permitted social re-
volution by a relatively weak group, but this is hardly an exception to
the rule.
As for the accumulation of capital, while many small but collectively
impor+ant technological advances can be devised and put into use by one
man on a farm or in a small shop, other eseential ones require large aums
of capital which only a man or group of men with wealth, financial contacts,
or social influence can aggregate. 7xamples of such projects Are the
improvement of road, railroad, canal , or ocean transportation, power
development, urban utilities, and large scale industrial ventures. It
is difficult to exaggerate the importance of improvements in transportation,
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communication, and power in stimulating technological changy in other
industries. A combination of wealthy men, access to a national s.r regional
capital Market, or ability to tirn government finance to the purpose,
has been necessary to carry out such projects.
Why should the irembers of a group in thn lower echelons of the elite
turn vigorously at a certain time in history to economic development?
An exaiination of common characteristics of all of the groups which
have done so in various coutries suggests the answer. The first part
of that answer is that a group does so only If it feels that its social
status has been suppressed below its due, or is in danger of suppression.
iresumably the feelin. arises from an actual reduction of historical
status, or from a threat of reduction. In England, the agricultural
revolution which preceded the Industrial Revolution was carrb'd out by
members of the landed gentry-but they were a country group to whom the
urbanite group of gentry manifested a sende of superiority. The Industrial
Revolution itself was carried out by Scots, who had been cohquered by
the English, and whose religion was looked down upon by the Church-of-England
gentry, and 1y : -. nconformists in England itself. The Intellectuals of
Russia; ;he Antioquians of Colombia who have been looked down upon as
"country cousins" by the urhanites of Bogota; and immigrants in many
countries, not fully accepted by the local society, provide other examples
of the vigor of such lower echelon elite in their reactia to social
*
subordination. The example par excellence provided by Japan is discussed
*
Migrants also are affected by the influence of having been torn
loose from their native culture, They do not fit into the new culture,
by obserking cultural differences they forcefully learn that social ways
are not inevitable, and that man is free to pew paths. In fact, their
o3r4 paths are not available and they are forced to tread new ones. These
circumstances bring what Toynbee calls the "stimulus of new ground."
in more detail below.
The principle that onl a group driven by an urge to regain or
maintain a fightful social status will carry out the revolutionary actions
wich complete the transition to continuing technological advance, I term
the "law of the subordinated group."
But a subordinated group may rebel by armed force, turn to religious
mediation, traditional learning, or the study of pure science, or lapse
into passivity. What are the conditions which cause it to channel its
energies into economic development?
Obviously one is that a base of scient fic knowledge adequate for
technological progress is availabin. Before the seventeenth century,
cuntinuing rapid technoloical advance was highly unprobable in any society,
simpply because an adequate foundation of scientific knowledge was ladking.
But the exuberant scientific advances of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, which reached a climax in the great Galileo-Mewton theoretical
synthesis concerning the nature of the physical world,* and the concomitant
*See Alfred siorth Ihitehead, Essays in Science and Philosophy
(New York, 1948), Chapter on "The First Physical Synthesis" (pp. 166-176).
discoveries in mathematical and physical method, provided an expanding
base for continuing scientific and technological progress. Lack of
scientific bals has not subsequently been a bottleneck. Ideas existing
in one culture are not necessarily availabin to another culture; but
the difficulties no longer Ie in the limited nature of human technical
knowledge.
E :onomic opportunity must be present , but scientific and technical
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knowledge is economic opportunity. Uther factors of the nature of his-
ti 'ical accidents, may make econoric opportunity especially great.
The great improvements in ocean navigation from the later fiddle Ages
onward facilitated British export of textiles throughout the world in
the lzter eighteenth century. But it was the technological advances
in the British spinning and weaving industries, which by reducing costs
created their own econoiIc opportunityr, which must be given the irraedIate
credit for the seizufe of dominance in the world market. Tremendously
favorable natural resources and a vast jimarket stimulated eccnomic growth
in the United States, and later the same factors favofed #he Soviet Union;
but the case of Japan demonstrates the lack of any necessity for such
favorable economic factors, if the social factors are highly conducive
to developi.ent.
The Li.embers of the group must of couese possess a combination of
world view and motivational structure which lea-is them to attack their
problem rather than to accept their fate. An active social world view
is perhaps automatically present in the circumstances; the gnpup, having
possessed a higher social status in the past, knows that its possession
is conceivable. A dominant physical world view will automatically be
present somewhere in the society, because it is necessarily intertwined
wihh the long development of techniques and scientific knowledge that
have preceded this point in history. But there seems no necessary
reason why the subordinated group snould be ami.ong tnose possessing a
scientific world view. Probably it is necessary to state as a separate
condition that unless the eliegroup in question is characterized by
such a world view, it will not turn to economic prgress for the solution
of its problem. Whether the possession of an appropriate need structure
is another independent condition , or whether the social situation
itself will generate a favora le structure, is a ii.ore complex question.
It is discussed later.
Meanwhile, consider a further cundition concerning class relation-
ships. "A, is Solmet~lmes stated that the incentive to economic progress
is the greater, the greater the degree of s ocial viobility. This is
true, in a sende, but it wo uld be equally true to atate toat the incentive
to economic progress is the greater, the greater the degree to which
social mobility is blocked. The correct stateLent is as follows: The
less the availability of traditional channels of social ascent-either
because there are no stuch channels, class position being traditionally
fixed, or because they are blocked to the social group in question- and
the greater the apparent possibility of s ocial risi, through increase in
economic power, the greater will be the tendency to devote energies to
economic developmient. This rule may be termed "the law of social blockage."
The histories or China and Japan respectively during the past several
centuries illustrate both sides of this coin.
In China, high social prestige was associated with status as landed
gentry. Trading was in low esteem, but members of a family th t wias
nder economic pressure sometimdes left the land and tieraed to the less
respectable occupatiun of tradinu in order to improve the family's fortune.
hovement from trade upward to landed gentry status was possible; i.e. land
co)ld be purchased and through its ownership landed gentry status attained.
dence persons who made money in trade ioved back to the land. This mobility
probably deterred economic development by channeling energies back toward
"landedness."
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In Japan, on the other hand, where a strictly feudal clasa structure
existed and mobility between classes was not possible, the merchant
class could not escape froi its role. The peasant held land in feudal
tenure, not in fee simple, and until the last half of the eighteenth
centary a trading farily that "bought" a land had no recourse against
the refusal of the feudal lord to recognize its claim. In that half
century, wealthy traders playing on the great need of t ie lords (damyos)
for loans, gained tacit acceptance-of their role as landel intermediaries.
Urtil that time, locked into their economic role as traders they con--
tinusid to devote their energies to the expansion of trade arm to related
aconomic activities. This devotion of energies was a significmnt force
"S6e Marion J. Levy, 'Dasts4pde Factors in the MIodernisaton of
China and Japan", in KuzneWs, 1oore, and Spengler, eds., &%onomgi Growth:
Brazil, India, Japan.
toward development, even thouLi before the finai stage of the transition
other groups assumed the more active roles.
The principle of group protectiun, the law of group subor ination,
and the law of s ocial blockage seei to vie to provide needed liire in
the theory of social change. dow does g3&oup subordination aris within
a society? In a changing world no society is ever perfectly intgrated,
in the sense that the motivations and values held by all of its onstituent
groups are consistent, and the role of each gro ip in the society srtisfies
the emotional needs of the group. Mligrations, wars, and any iumbe- of
historical changes within a society will change the relatiue :ositicon
of social groups and cause one of them to feel subordinated. In the
present context, the emergence of a lesser or greater degree o.' subordintion
must be regarded as a historical accident, ad exogenous facto)-.
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The conditions suggested above should nc t be v ga:c4dd as prerequisites
for economic development, but as forces tending to c ause or to prevent
change, whose interplay determines the path and speed of movement of the
society. 'Lhe greater the deCree of tension between two groups, the greater
the extent to which traditional paths of advancement are blocked to the
rembers of a subordinated elite group, the greater the degree to which
social institutions and power relations leave open movement toward economic
prowess, the broader the base of scientific a md technical knowledge available
as a base for futther advance, and t hP more active the world view and the
higher the need ackieveme4nt and need autonomy of the members of the subor-
dinated group, the greater will be the probabilitjy of completing a
transition to continuing technological change. The transition may go
forwird if certain of these conditions are preseid only in low degree,
provided other are present in very high degree.
Let me now turn to the question passed pver above. to the appearance
of need achievemto.t and need autonomy in high degree independent of the
variables just listed, or will the presence of these factors in high
degree also tend to inculcate the necessary motivatiuns?
It does not seem possible to give even a tentative answer to this
question.The tensions arising in a subordinated group, zind be Lween that
group and otheir. groups in the so ciety, may tend to incnlcate in the
young motivations radically d:L ferent from those that had been transmitted
from generation to generation before the tensions nrose. As exarples
of how this might occur, when parents are tense, the home environment
of the child will differ in various and subtle ways from that in previpus
generations with tensions absent; relations of children with children
not of their group may have : high emotional content and may therefore
be of unusual influence in creating miotivations; youths of the group
may form groups of their own, with mores and standards different' from
those of their elders (so-called "youth cultures").
If such a change in motivations occurs in many members of a younge?
generation, or over several generations, the widespread approval within
the group of new modes of behavior will insulate its ammbers in consider-
able degree from the inhibiting effects of the disapproval of Other
groups in the society. Thus group pressures may both change the unconscious
motivations that govern a man's use of hi.s energies, and provide reinforce-
ment for the new motivations throu,;hout his life.
McClelland has presented interesting evidence thAt the "protestant
ethic" leads to "independence training", that is, early childhood training
encouraging independent actions at an early age, and tends t hus to cause
the child to feel satisfaction and emotional security in independent
behavior, or, in other words, to inculcate need achievement and need
autonomy. Since the Protestant ethic in turn undoubtedly arose out of
*D. C. McClelland, "Some Social Corasequences of Achiev.:;int Hotiva ion,"
in Nebraska Symosium on Mhtivation, harshall Jones, ed. (1955) pp.41-72.
social tensions, this is one possible mechanism by which social tensions
may cause the motivations necessary for action.
On the other hand, knowledge of the entire constellation of social
circumstances which affect the motivations of the young is so slight that
undoubtedly no responsible psychologist would venture a statement concerning
the general rela tionship be*ween group subordination and the inculcation
of igotivations in the young, It may be that in general the appearance
of high need achievement and high need autonomy in a group is due to
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historical forces .tich are independent of those which have caused the
group to feel improperly subordinated. One suggestion may be made.
Certainly a world view of oneself as able to master nalare and affect
her operations is causally related to need achievement, It is difficult
to conceive of an individual who is highly motivated to repeatedly
attack new problems and test his ability to aster them, who at the
same time believes that he is within th physical world and a helpless
subject of its operations. Hence a view of self as over nature must
to a considerable degree precede need achievment.
The discussion so far has dealt only with forces within the society,
except for reference to w orld events as providing economic opportunity
to %ngland. The external forces may also be imprtant. Concerning expansion
of the world narket, there is little to be said in principle except that
rapid expansion of the rarket provides especially favorable economic opportunity,
and the more favorable the e conomic situation is, the greater the incentive
to channel energies into technological progress. It may be observed
empirically, however, that neither in the iJnited States, Japan, the Soviet
Union, nor the newly developing countries of Latin America has an exbanding
eport market played an improtant role in the later stages of the transition.
Expansion of the world market played an imp.rtant role in stimulating the
initial devel~pment of extractive and agricultural industries, and in the
later stages of development exports have continued to be important, except
in the case of the Soviet Union, to provide foreign exchange for needed
imports., But technological progress has centered in industries producing
for the dcxestic market. Hence it is easy to exaggerate the role of the
uD rld market. It has not been a uniquely ihportant force, though of course
it has exerted a helpful buoyant effect,
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Technical knowledge is now available to any country in the world
from technically more advanced countries. Its availability does not,
however, make it possible for any society to by-pass that long cumu-
lative growth Df scientific and technical knowledge sketched above.
While the time period involved can be telescoped considerably, a process
of essentially the same nature must be gone through whether the sociejy
is developing its own science and technology or has knowledge from abroad
available.
This is true for two reasons. One is that science is not simply
knowledge, but also an attitude toward the physical world. Individuals
in&, an "underdeveloped" society cannot learn science and becon.e techno-
logical innovators as they might learn a foreign language and become able
to speak it. They will not apply science in their thinking until basic
change has occurred in their world view, motivations, and values. Only
as these changes occur will individuals in the society devote their
energies effectively to technology and demonstrate creative initiative
in it. The study of science and the necessary change in these personality
traits react upon each other, so that the ready availability of knowledge
somewhat accelerates the process, but by the same interaction the incul-
cation by the culture of unfavorable personality traits inhibits the
development of the 'scientific mentality". The total change required
is a complex social process as well as a mental one; no sociy can
by-pass it.*
*
Japan and the Soviet Union are sometimes cited to the contrary.
However, evidence which cannot be cited here for laik of space makes
fairly clear that underlying recent economic progress in the Soviet
Union is a process of social change that has been evident since at least
the early nineteenthcentury. The 250 years of social change which pre-
pared the way for "modernization" in Japan are discussed in Section VI
of this paper.
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The other reason is that, although the principles of physical
science are the same in all societies, a complex of production tech-
niques in one society cannot -imply be copied in another, as one man
ktight wear another man's clothes. The roles played in a factory or other
production unit by every type and level of worker and manager, and the
relationships amonth them a nd between supplier, producer, and customer,
depend on the culture of the society. In the culture of another society,
the patterns of behavior will be so different that even purely technical
production process may have to be altered to make them fuction efficiently.
The process of adaptation involved may be different in degree, but is
not different in kind, from the process of invention. The availability
of teehnical knowledge from another culture, thoigh it eases somewhat
the process of transition to continuing technological progress, there-
fore does not change essentially the social process involved.
The two other external influences, social pressure on the society
from without, and change in the social structure by physical force, need
fuller consideratiun.
If a sense of subordination felt by a social group, in circumstances
in which economic prowess seems the most promising remedy, is a power-
ful force toward technological progress, it seems reasonable that a threat
to an entire nation from without may exert the same influence on the
entire nation.
The unifying force, in a divided nation, of an external threat is
well knownc If gain in economic strength sees the most likely way to
ward off the external threat, such a threat would seem logically to be
a powerful force toward development. This in fact seems the only force
likely to motivate the top social group toward change. The clearest
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case of strong external preswure humiliating the nation, without more
than marginal intervention in the internal affairs of the society by
the foreign powers, is provided by Japan. In the case of Japan, internal
factors had &Lso moved the society far favNa peasant society values toward
ones favorable to technological change. The total effect was a strikinly
rapid transition to rapid technological progress. The effect of external
pressure is perhaps better appreciated by examining the case of Japan.
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than in the abstract, and the reader is referred to Section VI, which
sketches the Japanese experience.
If such external pressure is a favorable factor, would not the
propulsion toward technological progress be even greater if the foreigners
actually enter and dominate the country? Almost ceftainly not, because
of another psychologicql effect of such intervention in the society.
If technological progress is to spread throughout a society, once it has
been initiated by some group, the action of the innovating group must
form a miodel which is iUitated by the rest of the society. If this
reaction is to occur, the society as a whole must have cormion cultural
bonds with the innovators. They must not be so alien--so different fom
othe* groups--that their activity creates emotional antipathy rather than
desire to achieve equal success by doing likewise. Further, their conduct
must not be such that in itself it creates emotional antipathy.
Colonial administrators and businessmen everywhere violated both
rules, in virtually the m.ost offensive ways possible. They were egregiously
alien-in appearance, conduct, and values. They disrupted the native
culture and violated its deppest ethical and m.oral values. By introducing
Western systems of land ownership by individuals in fee simple they
destroyed rights in land that were the basis of community life and that
were sanctioned by sanctions as deep-seated as, say, the right of parents
to rear their own children in the West. By introducing Western law and
rules of evidence they insured that court decisions would flaunt the
basic moral codes of the society. By introducing contract, they deprived
the unfortunate of tneir right to comunity alleviation of the unforeseen
rigors of a tricky agreement. They showed co.ntempt for native religion,
and arrogantly and unnecessarily comriatted sacrilegious acts.* And they
*
It was psychologically necessary for the colonialists to behave
in these ways, for only by assuring themselves of t heir own superiority
and the worthlessness of native values could they justify to themselves
their encroachment and rule by force.
possessed such power that rebellion was hopeless.
This behavior almost certainly has tyo important effects that are
relevant to the problem of econom.'c growth. First, the hopelessness of
action militPs- .#*& strongly to create a view that no action is wo.!hwhile,
and to prevent the development of achievemiut motivation. Secondly, the
emotional bewilderment resulting oreates an intense need to hold on to
the old values that alone stand ;.etween life and chaos, and resentment
and horror at the ruthless intrusiu create a deep unconseious antipathy
toward the new occupations and new economic roles introduced by the aliens.
Mary a clerk, consciously anxious tu do well under the new masters, must
have been unconsciously completely debarred from devoting initiative and
energy in the new economic func)Aon. Thus colonial administration effectively
blocked incentive to particiiate in economic development, even where it
provided capital and knowledge of advaneed techniques.*
*
The unconscious blocks to interest in the new occupations are not
inconsistent with imitat 4hn of certain cultural values of the aliens--
e.g., &heir spprzi the- dress, various of their attitudes. On the
contrary, certain principles of psychiatry suggest that the two modes
of behavior are to be expected at the same time. This problems however,
involves too great a digression to discuss here.
All of the dynamic forces discussed in this section, except the adverse
effects of colonial rule, are illustrated vividly in the history of Japan
since 1600. This essay concludes, therefoee, with the citation of Japanese
history as an illustration of the application of the analytical model to
reality.
VI. An Application of t he Analytical Model: Economic Growth in Japan.
The event conventionally taken as marking the beginning of "moder--
nization" in Japan is the eiji Restoration of 16b6, but the roots of
modernization lie centuries earlier. For convenience we may begin the
account with the seizure of national power by the Tokugawa clan at the
beginhing of the seventeenth century.
The social cider in Japan at the time may be described loosely as
feudal. For centuries seweral hundred lords, heads of ian or clans, had
*1 is erhap
*The ko rd clan is perhaps the English word most closely equivalert
to the Japanese word Ihan, but it implies blood relationshiip that was not
necessarily true in the han.
ruled local areas and had contested for ;ga4er. From time to time one
of them had gained a greater or less degree of hegemony over others and
at three times between the thirteinth and sixteenth centuries one
tfss had gained control over all Japan arnd gained the title of shogun
(loosely, comrander-in-chief) from the Emperor. Each feudal lord (or
daimyo) had his band of warriors or samurai. Samitrai, ranging from the
daimyos down to smae so poor that they cultivated land, constituted t1r
*
nobility of Japan.
Apparently they were divided into six not very well distinct classes
or grades. It has been estimated that at the time i)f the iNeiji Restoration
they and their £anilies constituted some six or eight percent of the popu-
lation.
eeasahts held their land, not directly ftam the daimyo in most cases,
but from intermediaries to whom they paid feudal dues, and who in turn
paid feudal dues to the d&imyo. The intermediary might be either a
samurai or a person socially of the peasant class whose family in the
historic past had gained control of t he land of his village. It is not
clear whehAer the peasants were serfs, i.e. were legallyt bound to the
land, before the Tokugawa era, but in ary case religious veneration of
his familial home bo und the-peasant to his land.
Merchants, no matter how well-to-do, remained socially at the level
of peasants and artisans, if not below. A merchant, even if wealthy,
could become neither samurai nor even peasant, for he could buy neither
noble rank nor land.
At the apex of the pyramid was the Faperor. lie had no aniy. His
power was symbolic, not physical. In most feudal societies the emotional
loyalty of the individual extends only to the lord immediately above him.
In Japan, however, by a unique cultural tradition, the overriding obligation
of each individual was directly to the E peror.
During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centgries, European nations
had been advancing steadily around India into the Pacific. First the
Portuguese, thenthe French, Dutch , and English, pressing forward
in the name of the Church or of %pire, and impressing their power on
the native inhabitants bygawgar, loot, and rape, had seized areas in
India, the Malay Peninsula, and the East Indies, and had felt their way
up along the coast of China. ieanwaile Spain had reached the Philippines.
Japan was spared only because she was fartheut away and because neither
in trade nor in natural resources did she seem to offer much bounty.
The Tokugawa were fully aware o the Avance, for Japanese merchantmen
sailed as far as halaya, and by contact with seamen from all of East
and South Asia had kept well informed of the approach of the Europeans
and of their power add ruthlessness.
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The Tokugawa daimyo Ieyasu with thi aid of a number of allied (or
Fudai) da'myo, had established hegemony over virtually all of Japan by
16M0. In 1603 he obtained from the Emperor the title of shogun. There-
after the Tokugawa exercised a military dictatorship, using powers initially
granted by the 2aperor to an earlier shogun during a civil war. During
the period 1603-1651, Ieyasa and his successors Hidetada and Iemitsu
executed a series of measures designed to freeze Japan in the existing
social mold and perpetuate the rule of the Tokugawa family. They succeeded
in. perpetmating that rule until 166b; yet with these measures, paradoxically,
t .e modernization of Japan may be said to begin.
They were directed primarily at holding forever in their inferior
place the non-allied or "outside" lords--or, to use the Japanese term,
tae Tozama daiiiyos. "hen occasion 'e pretext plirmitted , the Tokugawa
accused a too ptwerful Tozama daimyo of disleplty executed him, moved
his son to lands farther from Tokyo, and placed one of the Fudai daimyos
on his former lands. Whether by such relocation or by the initial geo-
graphic alignment of cland, four of the most powerful of the Tozama group,
the Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Uizen clans, were located at the western
tip of the main island Honshu and on the farther islands of Shikoku and
Kyushu. The Tokugawa also interspersed Fudai daimyos among the Tozara
&iimyos, to watch over contacts among thei.
On the Tokugawa lands, and with tegard to natiunal problems, the
elaborate LAdinistrative system set up by the Tokugawa ruled. The force
of custorm and the limitation of Tokugawa power prevented this body of
administrators froa controlling the internal matters of other clans, but
they regulated in detail all activities which might increase the strenght
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of the clans. For example, any roadway or bridge or any addition to a
building, however m-ll, had to be approved by the Tokugawa administration
before being built. %hey cut down the economic strengI.vof a prospering
Tozama daimyo by requesting him in the name of the Paperor.to assume
responsibility for a costly public project--the maintenance of a section
of the national highway, the fortification of a port, etc.
T,: prevent the Tperor from becoming the focus of a hostile alliamce,
the Tokugawa isolated him, While establishing their own court at Tokyo,
they left the r'9peror and his c .urt at Kyoto, surrounded him, and set
up a system by which all approach to him was through Tokugawa intermediaries,
who carried messages in and replies out.
And to prevent soaial change which might disturb the status quo,
the lokugawa attempted to freeze e:Aing class relationt by a series of
regulations forbidding any ma.n to change his occupation, and prescribing
the style of his home, his dress, and his bebavior.
Among these doestic measures to preserve their power, "Sankin-Kotai"
was the capstone. Ihia was the requirement that the wife and children
of every daimyo must live in Tokyo under Tokugawa protection, and that
the dalmyo himself must maintain his residence there every other year.
The primary purpose of Sankin-Kotai of course was to have hostages against
revolt. However, in cimbination with the distant location of the four
major Tozama daimyos it was also intended to impose heavy expenses on
them which would keep them poor. But the effect of the greater burden
and of their location was also to create greater resentment among them,
to spur them to greater economic dfforts, to leave themn farthest from
the watchful eyes of the Tokugawa, and to bring them into easiest contact
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stdth the Dutch at Nagasaki. (See below). As a result, they grew stronger
rather t han weaker, and more ready to change the old social order, gene-
ration by generation.
The remiaining niche in the wall, it se -med, was ingress by foreign
powers. The Tokugawa could not control the foreigners ouside of Japan,
but to prevent any alliance with them or invitation to them by hostile
groups in Japan, the Tokugawa reversedtthe trad tion of friendly reception
of foreigners, and took steps to cut off any contact with them through
missionaries, traders , or travellers, the only possible channels. Between
150 and 1600, despite opposition and persecutions, Catholic missionaries
had iade perhaps 300,000 converts in Japan, and by 1614, possibly 50000.
*
0. B. Sansom presents these estimates in The Western World and
Jaan (New York, 1951), Ch. 9. This book contains the best description
available in Ehglish of the Tokugawa era and the forces leading to change.
testimony to the tensions in the Japanesesocial order. In 1614, on report
that missionaries were plotting to involve Spain in Japan, or fear that
they i-dght try to do so, Ieyasu expelled them. By ruthless suppression
between 1614 and 1625 he and Hidetada virtually extirpated above-board
Christianity in Japan. It survived in hiding. When it again became
legal in the Meiji era, a few Christians declared themselves.
In 1637 Iemitsu suwmarily ordered all foreign traders fsN-A the country
except a few Chinese an Dutch. By 1641 he had completed the expulsion.
He closely supervided the Chinese, and confined the Dutch to one trading
post at Nagasaki, on Kyushu Island. He and his successors kept the
Dutch there partly to obtain desired impovts, but partly deliberately
to have a channel of infomation concerning the West, A contemporary
Japanese said: "To defend ourselves against the barbgrians, we must
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know them and ourselves: the way to know them is through Dutch studies."
* Quoted in Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development
in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1866-1680 (Stanford, 1955), p. 2.
To limit all foreign contacts to this one supervised spot, the Tokugawa
forbade the construction of ships with a capacity of more t han thirty
deadweight tons, forbade foreign travel, and orderdd that any foreigner
setting foot on Japanese soil should be expelled or executed.
The result of these measures intended to freeze the present into
the indefinite future was to create currents of change in almost every
aspect of Japanese life. Because of the "pax Tokugawa" the samurai lost
their function. dome of them became civil administrators for their
daimyos; others lived a purposeless ceremonial life.
Internal travel and trade increased twemendously. The national
highway from Xokyo south to Kyoto and Osaka and on west to Shimonoseki
bore dozens of processions in each direction annually, as daimpos and
their retinues, some containing as many as nineteen hundred men, proceeded
.inially to or from Tokyo. Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka became great
cities, and the commerce necessary to supply them developed. Riie merchants,
with offices in Tokyo and Osaka, sprang into prominence. They developed
the substance, if not the fort, of double-entry bookkeeping. They pro-
vided safe transfer of money between the two cities by accepting money
in either and issuing in exchange an order for its payment in the other,
just as the Fuggers had done in the sixteenth century, and the Rothschilds
were to do in the eighteenth, between the ciih. of Europe. The continuing
increase in spending caused continuin&; inflation. While the existing
records donnot permit an exact account of price moveents, it is clear
that with some interruptins prices rose throughout the two and one half
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centuries of the tokugawx era.
A priie cause of the intensified spending was the social pressure
on each daimyo to indicate by the pomp of his travel to and from Tokyo
and the splendor Of his establishment at Tokyo the exalted le-*1 of his
position. To meet their financial needs, the daimyos and their retainers
strove to increase the productivity of rice production, and to develop
products which would have a national ale. The efforts were effective,
but they were not sufficient to- meet the needs--or, to reverse the statement,
the daimyos spent beyond their resources, however much these grew. They
attempted to ment the financial strain in three ways: lorrowing from
the merchants, by squeezing the samurai, and b:y extorting more frorm the
peasants. By the first h4lf of the nineteenth century these measures
and the other forces for change sketched above had created almost unbearable
tena ons in the Japanese social system.
Daimyos' debts to merchants grew cwlulatively. There are records
of daimyos who near the end of the Tokugawa era owed amounts equal to
seven years' revenues. These financial operations combined with the
great growth of trade swelled the income, wealth, and influence of the
merchants. By the last half of the eighteenth centptry some of them
could violate with impunity the prohibition against change of occupatio,
and purchased from samurai or wealthy peasants their positions as landed
intermediaries. Formally, the daimyos could disavow the merchants' title
and seize the land, but they were o longer in position to do so. Some
merchants procured mobility for their daughters. While it would have
been disgraceful for a samurai to marry except into the samurai class,
some wealthy merchants succeeded in having a daughter adppted by a samurai,
to be umarried in a few zionths or a few hours to a daimyo vo other sU3urai,
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presumably to thq financial benefit ofboth the husband and thq adppting
father. On adoption the girl's name was erased frA the family roll of
her natural father; only in the memories of all concerned did the relation-
ship remain. But in spite of their new economic power, merchants were
still social ltferiors, finding a place only where their financial power
made it impossible to push them out.
From the peasants, daimyos increased dues and levies on whatever
pretext they could. The peasant level of living progressively deteriorated
during the last half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the
nineteenth. eeasant revolts became startlingly frequent. In no case
was the revolt an attempt to end peasant status; all were protests agdnst
unbearable exactions. They testify the more vividly to the extremity
to which peasants had been driven, since they were so unthinkable in
Japanese culture that often the peasant leaders surrendered voluntarily
to death sentence after the revolt, having known in advande that while
the protest was imperative, this result for the leaders was unavoidable.
Wealthy peasants, the leaders of their communities, suffered not
merely from daiaio exactione, but from the general course of social change.
As growing trade and the widening web of comunication reduced the dependence
of each family on the local conarunity, local institutions deteriorated
and the peasant leaders found their coimmunity function decaying. In
search for a substitute, they sought educatiun especially education in
government and war. To becoze educated was a violation of the rules of
their placd in life, but they easily found impoverished samurai to teach
them. Thus by the middle of the nineteenth century there was a considerable
group of wealthy peasants knowledgedeable far beyohd the bounds of their.
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traditional position.
As the daiiyos' financial position worsened, they found it necessa-y
to reduce successively the stipends they paid their samurai. Successive
laws were passed for samurai relief, yeb the deterioration of their position
continued. Sme bedame ronin or wanderers. Some literally wandered, in
roving bonds; others went to one of the cities and, though tiey made a
living there in some way, were spititually wanderers, men who had abandoned
their destined place in life.
But ill times had cane to samurai long before this financial di.stress.
The loss of their function had left thei. no purpose in life. Their military
exercises became a shallow form, and deased to occupy their lives. In
the latter seventeenth century, the Tokugawa had issue an order that
samurai should study traditional Chinese learning, and many busied them-
selves in studying the elte way of life depicted there.
Then a movement toward "Dutch studies" slowly grew and became a
flowing tide. Through the Dutch at Nagasaki magpainstakingly began to
learn the Dutch language, in order to gain a 6uaintance with the know-
ledge of Europe. Before 1800, Dutch gramars and Dutch-Japanese dictionaries
had been prepared; Dutch schools openefi, and many bookd or parts of books
translated. They dealt with physicd, mathematics, geology, geogr*ykV,
astronomy, navigation, metallurgy, engineering, rilitary tactics, medicine,
government, and other subjects. Later, important schools for the "study
of barbarian books" were opened--only one by the Tokugawa, several by
the outer clans. In the first half. of the nineteenth century, laboratories
were established to perform on a pilot scale the processes described in
the scientific books. Mrgnr pilot metallurgical processes were performed
with the guidance only of Western texts, that is , without any technical
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advice. lhen full scale enterprises were established-an iron ore smelter,
one or more reverberatory furnaces, and an iron fourry, to cast, among
other things, cannon. The emphasis was on metallurgy and armament.
It probably is not fanciful to suggest that the samurai were drawn
strongly to such studies because the Westerners were powerful warriors.
The study of western strengt'1was a s'ymbolic substitute for the vanished
power of the samurai. Later, its relation to the defense of Japan became
more ani atore clear. The threat to Japan ftom the West grew. During
the first half of the nineteenth centr,' Russia and the Western powers
made a number of "requests" of Japan, which she turned away with difficulty.
I. seeking the sources of Weaterh strengtI% the samurai were prepa.ing
to perform the nobleet of their historic functions, the defense of Japan.
By the first half of the nineteenth eentury, the disintegration df
the social order became more and more evident. The morchants, the peasants,
and the samurai were breaching cJ6 social walls. The Tozamua daimyos were
nibbling away at the restrictions that had been placed on them. The
Tokugawa became more and rmore incapable of governing. Diffusion of
authority, presumably to provide wider and this wiser counsel, * had begun
*
But probably unconsciously because the obligation to pe-form propeiy
the function attached to one's place in life is the most compelling sanction
of the Japanese culture. If a single individual were responsible for a
policy wnich failed, the shame might be such that he would be forced to
comunit suicide. See Huth Benedict, The hrysanthaum and the Sword (New York,
1946).
in the seventeenth century. By the nineteenth it had proceeded so far
that it was often difficult to reach a decision, and action was paralyzed.
At this crucial juncture in Japanese history a foreign power appeared
again, with force notobe denied. In lb53 Commodore terry appeared in
I
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Tokyo Bay and announced that he would return the next year to obtain a
couercial treaty. tie reappeared with four small warships. If he had
wished, he could have blockaded the harbor, cut off the fleet of bcrges
which daily bruuNW: the city's supplies, and in a matter of a few weeks
starerd the city. It was not necessary. The Tokugawa, after admitting
their impotence by consulting with nobles to whom their predecessors
would have given orders, signed a treaty which opened two parts to Amerivan
trade, limited Japan's power to regulaje the trade, and authorized the
United States to send a consul. to Japan if either nation wished. In
1856 Townsend Hatris arrived, and despite the earnest entreaties of the
Tokugaw' . and their protest that the Japanese text provided for a consul
only if both nations assented, established himself at Tokyo. In 1857
he negotiated an agreement expanding brade, authorizing added consuls,
and providing extraterriorality for Americans accuded of crime in Japan.
Other Westerb countries demanded and received commercial treaties similar
to that with t he United States.
Japan was saved from dismemberment like that of China by a world
situation that kept potential aggressors occupied. In the United States
civil war occurred. Napoleon III was preoccupied with the rise of Ger-
Perhaps United States traditions would have prevented her from
occupying an area of Japan in any case.
many and with his kiexican adventure. Britqin was similar concerned with
European questions, and needed her overseas streng ioto meet troubles
in India. Russia was too weak to act alone. Thus Japan had time to
conduct a great internal debate concerning the appropriate response to
the ggreusion from abroad.
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The humiliation of the forced treaties fanned anti-foreign feeling.
It was inflamed further by violations by the Europeans of Japanese con-
ventions of personal behavior--often unintentiunal, but nonetheless
arrogant, and by shows of force which demiotstrated Japan's impotence,
such as a joint bombardment of Shimonoseki in 1864,* and a British bombardment
After A.erican, French, and Dutch vessels had been fired on in turn
by the Choshu, in pursuance to an order to expel all foreigners.
of Kagoshima in 1862.*
*
In punitive retaliation for the beheading by a samurai of an E-nglish-
man, Richardson, for a grave (perhaps unwitting) breach of conventional
behavior, namely remaining on horseback and staring at a daimyo as his
procession passed.
Superficially, the debate over national policy was meaningless.
The Tokugawamcalled for preservation of Japanese ways against the external
pressure, but signed concession after concession. Opposition groups
denounced these, but suggested no way of avoiding them. let under the
slogans lay a clash on a vital issue. The Tokugawa cry was: "Open
the ports and help Tokugawa." It may be interpreted as meaning, "We do
not have. the strength to resist the foreigners. To prepare for resis-
tance would involve drastic social changes. Therefore we have no
alternative to opening the ports." The opposition cry, " Loyalty to the
Finperor. Repel the barbarians," no doubt was intended to capitalize on
popular resentment at the Tokugawa failure to repel the foreigners, but
it was for .ore than an irresponsible slogan. It meant, "We must acquire
the strength needed to repel the barbarians. To do so will require drastic
social action. let us restore the position of the Fiperor, thereby preserving
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a symbolic link with the past. And by rallying around him let us over-
throw the Tokugawa, in order that we may get on with the. job of making
the necessary changes." At he beginning of 1866 the Tokugawa formally
surrendered the vtandate of goverraont to the Emperor, without a military
struggle, and the new forces took over the government.
' Who fonned the two camps? Behind the Tokugawa stood the Fudai daftyos;
wealthy merchants who feared loss of their loans and their sources of
revenue if s cial upheaval disturbed the position of the daimyos; and
no doubt many who simply feared change. The opposition oonsisted of lower
order samurai, wealthy pensants , and merchants--the first two anxious
to restore meaning to their lives, the last eager to gain social status
commensurate with their economic power. But all three groups were
motivated deeply, not only by their personal frustrations, but also by
desire to end Japan's humiliation. And undoubtedly their drive for power
and for actiLn was supported by a bitter urge among all classes to restore
the nation's pride.
The new leaders came from these three groups. Within a half dozen
years they had completed a social revolution. To give the government
power, they abolished the daimnyos' feudal rents, and required instead
that the equivalent in taxes be paid directly to the central governmet.
(They appeased the ddmyos and samurai who thereby lost their source of
income by substituting pensions, but shortly afterward commuted the
pensions into bonds not reou s for eme years, and insufficient in
amount to yield income equal to the commuted stipends. This forced samurai
who did not gain higher positions to take jobs as policemen, factory
workeru, and the like.) To unify Japan economically they abolished all
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internal tolls and other obstacl"is to trade and transports. Above all
they took the lead in industrializing Japan, by pouring rnoney into a
national railroad and into manufacturing enterprises. (Within two decades,
when the manufacturing ventures were well established, they sold tierr.
at bargain rates to individuals who had been supporters of the new regime.)
Japan began tiat remarkable period of rapid tehonological advance which
has continued to the present. By the end of the century they were able
to obtain an end to extra-territoriality and to foreign co.Atrol of Japan's
tariff structure. By reaction to the humiliations they had suffered, they
dreamed elf Japan as the world leader, and led her on a road which ended
in World rar II.
'ibis history may be summarised in terms of the tUeoretical
structure presented in preceding section$, Social subordinati 'n of
elite gfoups-increasingly unbearable pressures on the samurai, decay
of the position of the wealthy peasants, and continued social suppression
of the merchants while they rose greatly in economic power-had progressed
over a period of two and one half centuries. While these social tensions
grew, six or eight generations of the subordinated elite were given a
tremeet.4ously broadened scope of external experience. This must have
altered basically their world view and need structure. They were providld
also with considerable experience in the management of changing economic
affairs, and exposed to an increas;ingly effective coursi of education
in Western science and technology, which their psychological frustratifn
led them tu absorb eagerly. At the same time, the foundations of the
social @lass structure were being undermined. Then, at the end of the
period, the entire nation was humiliated. The nature of the humiliation
made it clear that technological progress was the only possible road to
the restoration of national dignity, just as the internal situation made
it clear that economic prowess. offered the greatest opportunity to the
subordinated groips. With every circumatance favorable, Japan entered
upon continuing technological prggress.
Without the a cial tensions, new leaders eager to bring change would
not have been available. Without the new experience brought about by
Sankin-Kotai and related economic developrient, they would not have been
capable of economic leadership. Without the psychological frustrations
which drove the samurai to Dutch studies, they would not have possessed
the scientific and technical basis for rapid technological advanee.
With these conditions, the foreign aggression tripped off technological
progrees as surely as if it had been planned.
Even without the foreign pressures, a social explosion would surely
have occurred in Japan within a generation or two. But the country would
have suffered from divisions araong the clans and among the social classes.
It is impossible to know what the course or development would have been,
but it certainly would not have been unified rapid national progress in
economic development. But when foreign ingress humiliated the nation,
it sot only exerted a unifying force which caused the development of a
n o society, econejy, and polity, but, together with the other social
forces present, propelled VA unified nation toward rapid technological
progress.
There is no reason to suppose that the developspent of countries now
underdeveloped will parallel closely that of Japan. Indeed, obviously
it will not, because their cultures and social structure differ from
that of Japan. But it is reasonabbe to state that unless their own his-
torical progress produces attitudes, tensions, and incentives that are
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in a very general way similar to those that appeared in Japan, they
will not develop.
Appendix: The Population Problem
Since rise in per capita output depends on the rate of, population
increase being less than the rate bf increase in aggregate output, many
social scientists and virtually all demographers would state that deter-
minants of population trends must be included in t he model. On the
usual assumptions about the determinants of population growth, this view
is correct. By"the usual assumptions" I mean ones which make the rate
of population growth depend on er capta income, or on this except as
the "standard of living" changes.
However, a r considerations and such bits of empirical data as are
available (See Simon Kusnets, "Quantitative Aspects of the Economdc
Growth of Nations: I. Levels and Variability of Rates of Growth,"
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. V, No. 1, October 1956)
seem to me to indicate that the usual models of population determinants
are unrealistic. Without exception, wksever technological progress has
continued in a country for as long as a generation, * it has thereafter
*this qualification is intended to exclude cases such as China,
where the introduction of sweet potatoes and early ripening rice greatly
increased agricultural productivity without laying the basis for con-
tinuing advance. The result was population increase and apparently return
to approximately the previous level of living.
overbalanced population growth and brought rising living levels. I do
not believe that this result is fortuitous; I believe that the causal
relationships are such that if technological progress, even fairly slow
technological progress, is "built in," it will surely conquer the problem
of population increase.
Assume that the death rate depends on per capita income (via its
effect on caloric intake, public health measures, etc.), and that the
birth rate depends on the death rate, with a lag of a generation, The
logic of this model is that the birth rate is influenced by the number
of childa'en whaim it is necessary to bear in order to perpetuate the
family. In this model, assume that continuing technological advance
begins. When it has increased per capita income and the level of living
slightly, this increase causes a fall in the death rate. Population
increase then prevents further rise in per cp income for a generation
After a generation the birth rate falls in response to the fall in the
death rate. Without any change in the rate of technological advance,
M at income then rise, further. The death rate may then fall
further, and the process may repeat itself for several generations,
A generation after the death rate has ceased to fall, p caita income
will be slight throughout the period of increased rate of population
increase, In a modification of this model, it may be assumed that the
relationship between rate of technological advance, fall in death rate,
and fall in birth rate is such that continuing rise in per capita income
is considerable even during the period of population disequilibrima,
though of course not as rapid as subsequently. The former seems to have
been the case between 1760 and 1U00 in Nngland, the latter after about
1600. The duration of the period of rapid population increase will
depend on the length of tim.e required for the A7'h rate to fall to a
minimum.
Obviously, such a model is a greatly sir.plified version of reality,
but it seems to reflect the essential factors of popuation change in
the real world better than do the models. In this alternative model,
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the problenm of population icrease automatically comes to an end, and
it is not necessary to complicite the analysis of the text above by
explicit reference to it.
The problem of population density must be distinguished from that
of population growthit. Continuing technological progress and continuing
rise in living levels can t ake place in any country, no matter how den-
sely populated it is. However great the density .t population, with
continuing improvement in techniques, an economy can support a continually
growing population, or can provide a population constant in size with
a continually growing pei\gapita income, or can both support some con-
tinuing population increase and provide scle continuing increase in per
capita income.
With high population density relative to the quantity of nata:al
resourc% the amount of capital required per added unit of output per
capita may be greater, and the rate of growth in g c income
slower. Moreover, the more dense the population relative to the amount
of natural resources, the lower will be the per callta income than other-
wise, even thouth a continually rising level. hence the size of popu-
lation may appropriately be a matter for national concern and national
policy action in some countries.
But this problem of population size is not "the population problem"
in the usual sense of the term. "The population probik ' is the problem
of population growth, thought by some to threaten economic growth. Con-
cerning this, as I have indicated, I believe that the conventional ana-
lytical model is based on assumptions which lead to unrealistic conclusions.
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Soon after the appearance of the present paper, I shall prepare a
manuscript which states thesi ideas concerning population theory more
fully.
